10 A long hot century

We Have Worlds Inside Us

Edvard Munch, title of painting[1]

Whatever decisions and patterns of behaviour emerge from the New Twenty Years' Crisis, human society, globally, will face a *long hot century*.[2] It is the extent of the turmoil that remains to be seen. As presaged by the advent of superpower nuclear plenty in the 1950s,[3] and then the densification of globalisation over the next four decades, global interaction and issues have increasingly turned human society into a community of fate. The concatenation of threats resulting from the interplay between the epochal, structural, and decisional crises takes this to a new level. In these circumstances, the rational goal for human society is to create a world security community of communities, where war is practically unthinkable, and in which global issues can be pursued as collectively as possible. We have worlds inside us, but also one outside to lose.

Some critics of this book's empirical thesis might say that were the dangers that have been highlighted (especially in chapters 1 and 9) to

[1] Painting of 1894: see Iris Müller-Westermann, *Munch by Himself* (London: Royal Academy of Arts, 2005), pp. 132, 134. Munch took the idea from a poem by Paul Erik Tøjner, 'The Tree of Knowledge': 'Nothing is small, nothing is large / We carry worlds inside us' (from the exhibition, 'Edvard Munch by Himself', Royal Academy of Arts, October–December 2005).

[2] I chose this as the title of a lecture I gave at the Australian Defence Force Academy in 2002. I thought I had coined the phrase, but a search led to the discovery that it had been used by a Governor of Michigan, George Romney, who in 1968 said, against the background of the Vietnam War and riots in US cities, that the United States faced not only long hot summers at home, but 'the equally forbidding prospect of a long, hot century' throughout the world; quoted by William Safire, *Safire's Political Dictionary* (New York: Random House, 1978), p. 387.

[3] A major and insufficiently recognised theoretical contribution to understanding the impact of nuclear weapons on the traditional role of the territorial state was John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

come about, they would swamp any suggestions that have been made (and will be offered in the present chapter) about dealing with them effectively. Such a criticism may well prove to be correct, but if it is, so much the worse for all of us. Other critics will complain that the extrapolation of morbid symptoms throughout the book has been too pessimistic, while the references to cosmopolitan possibilities have been too optimistic. These critics, too, may well turn out to be correct about what actually happens in future, but they will have misunderstood my claim. For reasons explained in chapter 3, optimism and pessimism have played no part in my analysis, yet it seems to be impossible to avoid being accused of one or other; the 'frequent vulgarity' of their use is also something that has attracted John Berger's ire.[4] The theoretical commitment that has informed the analysis has been realistic not pessimistic, and the political orientation has been infused by hope not optimism. Uniting this realism of the intellect and hope of the will, to rephrase Gramsci, it is my belief, apparent throughout the book, that the Great Reckoning is not a time for sliding away from the spirit of the Enlightenment. Kant's famous injunction, 'Dare to be wise', was never more urgently needed.[5] Reflexive reason, animated by emancipatory politics and a cosmopolitan sensibility, building on the immanent potentials of world community, offers rational hope for advancing equality, humanising globalisation, and promoting human rights. These are at the heart of the Enlightenment's unfinished project of inventing a very uncommon humanity.

Means /ends

> As soon as these politicians are elected, that's the end of it . . . They have nothing to do with the people who put them in power.
> Joshiah Masiamphoka, subsistence farmer, Malawi[6]

The cosmopolitan project will remain incomplete unless the relationship in political life between means and ends is reconceived. The danger here, introduced in earlier chapters, is that of instrumental reason: the powerful tradition of dualism in political theory and practice. The

[4] John Berger, 'An Angel's Rage', *Le Monde diplomatique*, November 2006.
[5] Stephen Eric Bronner, *Reclaiming the Enlightenment. Towards a Politics of Radical Engagement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 151–67; Jonathan I. Israel, *Enlightenment Contested. Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man 1670–1752* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 863–71.
[6] Quoted by Joshua Hammer, 'Freedom Is Not Enough', *Time*, 14 November 2005.

challenge therefore facing emancipatory realism is that of embedding non-dualistic politics (that is, attempting to change the world by means that are equivalent to the changes we wish to bring about). Emancipation, after all, is a process not an end-point; it is being through becoming. Conceiving means/ends in a non-dualistic manner is not 'rocket science', as they say, but politically speaking it might as well be for those politicians and their supporters who seem unable to understand how the pursuit of an aim by its opposite prejudices the very objective being sought. I could illustrate this from numerous historical and contemporary cases, but I have chosen to discuss four means/ends themes in relation to US policy during the presidency of G. W. Bush. This is not because the Bush White House is an easy target, but because it is typical in everything but its prominence; furthermore, the failings of the world's most causal government are always the most consequential. The section will close with a discussion of the same four themes in relation to Africa, because of the rather different significance that continent has in world affairs.

1. *Political violence*

If we hope to reduce the scope of political violence, and ultimately eliminate war, one test of every aspect of a state's external policy must be whether it contributes to the delegitimation of violence as an instrument of politics. Ridding the world of war has been a long-held objective in international relations, collectively agreed in the International Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (the 'Kellogg–Briand pact') of 1928, in which eventually sixty-eight states renounced war as an instrument of national policy and committed themselves to settling disputes peacefully. Practically speaking, it proved, as was said at the time, to be a momentary 'international kiss' and a 'pious declaration against sin'. Despite such put-downs, violations of it were integral to the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials.[7]

Standard-setting is important in all social learning. Role models are also significant. The Bouldingesque aphorism 'If it exists it is possible' is relevant here. Western and central Europe, the historical cockpit of nationalist realism, and of political violence extending from terrorism to world wars, appears to have transcended international conflict by evolving into a Deutschian security community. Is such a development

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[7] The contemporary quotations are in Zara Steiner, *The Lights that Failed. European International History 1919–1933* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 573.

the result of unique historical factors? Must Europe remain the only multistate mature security community? If war can be transcended there, why not more generally?[8] There are of course many obstacles in the path of the construction of a world security community, where war becomes 'unthinkable' globally. These include: the realist fatalist assumption that there is no alternative; the Clausewitzian calculation of governments that specific objectives can only be secured by force; continued masculinist honouring of the military ethos; the religious legitimation of political violence in the militant traditions of Just War and Jihad; and the Waltzian view that wars occur when states cannot get their way on vital interests because there is nothing to stop them. Despite such obstacles, the empirical reality of security communities ensures that the end of war remains a rational hope.

The argument here is not a pacifist one; it accepts that political violence is sometimes excusable (in self-defence, for example). What must be overcome is the readiness with which certain governments use violence as a continuation of politics, as well as their employment of discursive practices that legitimise violence. The result of such behaviour is to replicate the idea that states are the ultimate war machines, which thereby constitutes and reconstitutes the states system as a war system. Eradicating the *potential* for violence in world politics is, of course, impossible. 'What is not a weapon in the wrong hands?' – the question disarmers grappled with in the run-up to the World Disarmament Conference in 1932 – is as pertinent as ever. The goal in relation to world security is, instead, to seek to marginalise and delegitimise the use of force as an instrument of politics. If states consistently pursued such a goal, the Clausewitzian rationale for using force would atrophy over time, with states maintaining armed forces solely as badges of independence and for vital disaster services, but no longer as instruments of external relations. Weapons cannot be 'disinvented', as is often said, and so the security dilemmas they provoke cannot ultimately be escaped; but security dilemmas can be transcended by creating the political conditions of trust (notably in the form of security communities).[9] In this

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[8] Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2008), ch. 7; the most thorough analysis of this important concept is Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); see also Alex J. Bellamy, *Security Communities and their Neighbours. Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). The original conception was Karl Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957).
[9] Booth and Wheeler, *Security Dilemma*, chs. 7 and 10.

sense war, though not the potential for violence, can be consigned to the dustbin of history.

By the test of contributing to the delegitimising of political violence, the Bush presidency has been a massive failure. The US-led decision to initiate a preventive war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 2003 not only failed this test, but it also proved to be a calamity in its own terms. For critics of the war (no supporters of Saddam Hussein, unlike the major intervening governments in the past) it was more important that the regime in Baghdad be changed *rightfully* than be deposed by *whatever means possible*, and that policy toward Iraq was conceived in relation to the wider Middle East. This meant, above all, that the United States and its Coalition partners give priority to conflict resolution in the Israel–Palestine imbroglio.[10] The war against Iraq failed every test in relation to the goal of delegitimising violence. It was unnecessary (there were alternatives), unrequired (Iraqi military power was eroding and contained), unneeded (the UN inspection system had largely been a success), illegal (it was not sanctioned by the UNSC), and unwise (because of its predictable negative consequences). The proponents of the invasion later pressed critics – following the deposing of Saddam – to agree with them that the world was a 'better place' without the Iraqi dictator. 'Of course' was the invariable answer, but the main point is that the world would be a 'better place' without many things (poverty, North Korea's nuclear weapons, nasty dictators, etc.) but that is not necessarily a justification for initiating preventive wars to bring about the regime changes that might have the desired result. Saddam was deposed but did the world or region become 'a better place' with the UN flouted, with duplicity and self-delusion displayed on a grand scale by the US and UK governments, with European governments deeply split, with new levels of mistrust in institutions and intelligence, with (uncounted) thousands of civilian dead in Iraq, with a growing death-toll in US, UK, and other military personnel, with the creation of the conditions for civil war in Iraq, with the turning of that country into a hothouse for local terrorists and a 'recruiting sergeant' for international terrorism, with the distraction of attention and resources from other more pressing dangers, and with unknown twists yet to come? Political violence cannot be delegitimised through preventive war.

[10] An impressive historical overview of the conflict, focusing on Israel, is Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall. Israel and the Arab World* (London: Penguin, 2001); a fascinating insight into the problems of negotiation is Ahron Bregman, *Elusive Peace. How the Holy Land Defeated America* (London: Penguin, 2005).

2. Democracy

Leaders who claim to be the standard-bearers of democracy must behave democratically. This test has particular urgency when such leaders attempt to persuade their citizens to go to war. There were mass protests across the world against the coming war in Iraq in the months leading to the invasion in 2003;[11] these were enough to encourage some governments, potential allies, to reject the Anglo-American regime-change project. The extent and depth of the protests were not of themselves proof that the protesters' arguments were valid, but such a degree of opposition in democracies *demands* that leaders listen more, and consult, and consider whether it is wise to go into a war when their citizenry is seriously divided. It is interesting to speculate, in this respect, whether Bush and Blair would have risked sending conscript armies on such a contested mission. One suspects not.

Protest against the coming war was ignored and belittled by the White House, as the leading policymaking group replayed the ideological certitudes, ethnocentric miscalculations, and arrogance of power that had led to the long and lost war in Vietnam.[12] Not surprisingly, if democratic impulses could be ignored at home, this was even more the case internationally. As a result of Tony Blair's influence, Washington did seek to use the UN to endorse the war, but the global body was cynically employed as an instrumental means, not as a consultative end, and it was ultimately ignored.[13] If a powerful state believes in democracy, even if it is the world's only superpower, it must sometimes accept that it might not get its way. As it was, the White House attempted through arm-twisting to bring the UNSC to endorse the war, and so make it legal. It failed, but even if this move had worked, and formal legality had been achieved, going to war would still have been unwise.

Behaving democratically on the international stage, has never been the way of US governments; like other states in the past, they have confused great power with great wisdom. US administrations since the Second World War, while urging the virtues of democracy, and ostensibly actively promoting it, have often found it impossible to bring about

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[11] A colourful celebration of those protests, showing that peace is not only better than war, but more fun, is Barbara Sauerman (ed.) *2/15 – The Day the World Said No to War* (New York: Hello, 2003).

[12] A set of interesting essays interrogating Vietnam–Iraq analogies is John Dumbrell and David Ryan (eds.), *Vietnam in Iraq. Tactics, Lessons, Legacies and Ghosts* (London: Routledge, 2007).

[13] Philippe Sands, *Lawless World. America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules* (London: Allen Lane, 2005), pp. 174–203.

a marriage of means and ends.[14] Whether in the UN (where the appointment of the blusteringly anti-UN figure of John Bolton as ambassador in 2005 could not be seen as other than a deliberate provocation to the global body), or in reacting against the inconvenient verdicts of foreign electorates (such as the victories of Allende in Chile in 1973 or Hamas in Palestine in 2006), the Washington way with democracy beyond its own waterfront has been to endorse it only as long as it is seen as serving the interests of the United States. This has been the case whether Washington has been in a 'multilateral' or 'unilateral' mood. When it comes to international relations, hubristic exceptionalism always overcomes the US commitment to democracy.

If the United States is serious about promoting democracy it should support it. Consistency is the test of whether US administrations *respect* democracy, or only sometimes act *in accordance* with it. The latter is the general verdict on US attitudes in the world outside the United States. Its record in promoting rogue states in the name of geopolitical interests, for example, greatly undermines its democratic credentials in the eyes of people in the street everywhere. Under the influence of maxims such as 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend', US governments have supplied local strongmen with weapons and diplomatic backing; meanwhile, they appear to have been relaxed about the way various tyrants have treated their own people. Agencies of the US government, when it has been thought necessary, have actually conspired in helping such strongmen maintain domestic 'order'. Saddam Hussein began as a regional strongman, and he lasted so long because his Western backers placed their own geopolitical interests before the well-being of the Iraqi people.[15] In the recent past, it was 'anti-communism' that provided the rationalisation for building up local tyrants in pursuit of geopolitical ambitions; today it is 'anti-terrorism'. Whatever the rationalisation, realism replicates rogues; and it is in the character of local strongmen to bite the hand that feeds them, if one day they come to believe it to be advantageous.

[14] This is relentlessly argued by Noam Chomsky, *Failed States. The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).

[15] During the Iran–Iraq War (1980–8) the US allowed Kuwaiti tankers to sail under the US flag, which meant that 'the United States effectively joined, on the Iraqi side, in the so-called "tanker war"'. The Iranian President, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, came to believe that the United States was even more comprehensively on the Iraqi side following the US attack on Iranian oil facilities, the elimination of the Iranian navy, and the shooting down of an Iranian civilian airliner. See Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, *Saddam Hussein. An American Obsession* (London: Verso, 2002), p. 81.

3. Law

Those who wish to live in a law-governed world should judge their own external policy according to the test of lawfulness. This will mean that powerful governments will sometimes be prevented from doing what they would otherwise choose to do, or what their power might enable them to do. If the rule of law is to prevail between as well as within states, the mightiest must consent, at times, to behave lawfully, even when that means they do not get what they want.

The vast majority of international law specialists have argued that the 2003 Iraq War was contrary to international law.[16] This was also the authoritative view of Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General at the time. Furthermore, the evidence is overwhelming that the legal case for the war 'was assembled after the decision to invade had been taken'.[17] The Bush–Blair leadership groups argued, before, during, and after the war, that their actions were both legal and legitimate. To most of world opinion, to the contrary, their actions revealed an ultimate contempt of international law, unless it was *their* international law. By adopting the position they did, they subsequently lost the right to criticise other states if and when the latter chose to place their own interests and interpretations beyond the constraints of international law. And their hypocrisy has not won friends or influence. Governments do not like to be lectured to by those who show only rhetorical respect for the law themselves. In the US case, what is particularly galling to many is the way it has allowed its friends (notably Israel) to disregard UN resolutions, while it has stressed compliance on those states it deems guilty until proved innocent. The imprudence of double standards, which goes hand-in-hand with treating other states with a lack of respect, is a lesson the White House may learn once again in the years to come as it seeks the assistance of Syria and Iran to help it extricate its diminishing 'coalition of the willing' from Iraq.[18] Superpowers should consider how others feel, as well as think.

After the ultimate disregard of the UN by the White House in relation the legality of the invasion of Iraq, the international lawyer Thomas Schoenbaum argued that the 'supreme irony' was the way in which the

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[16] Thomas J. Schoenbaum, *International Relations. The Path Not Taken* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 8–9.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 8; see also Sands, *Lawless World*, pp. 175, 193, 200–1.

[18] As recommended, for example, by the bipartisan Iraq Study Group: James A. Baker and Lee H. Hamilton, *The Iraq Study Group Report* (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), pp. 50–4.

administration then 'found the United Nations indispensable to realizing the goal of peace and democracy in Iraq'.[19] Because picking up the pieces smashed by the ill-named international community is in part what the UN exists for, Kofi Annan had no choice but to swallow his pride and try and do the honourable thing, whatever he thought of the original invasion.

Respect for the law should also have been central to the US response to the 9/11 attacks. Though the decision to declare a War on Terror was 'understandable' according to Louise Richardson, it was also 'very unwise'. It created the impossible goals (as stated by Bush) of attempting to 'rid the world of the evildoers' and to 'root out terrorism in the world', instead of the 'more modest and more achievable goal' (as identified by Richardson) of 'containing the threat from terrorism'.[20] One of the unacknowledged (because subconscious) drivers of the administration's reaction to international terrorism was the masculinist mindset of the neocons dominating policymaking; this played a part both in way the sense of outrage was expressed by the administration, and particularly in the way the 'bad guys' had to be dealt with. Grandiose goals were claimed (including bringing democracy to the Middle East) and just cause endlessly repeated; but the conduct of the war and its aftermath showed yet again that it is possible to justify anything if the cause is considered to be right (from enormously high Iraqi civilian casualties to the 'rendition' of prisoners).[21]

By choosing to react to the terror attacks according to a 'warfighting rather than crimefighting' logic, US policy risked reproducing the attitudes of the terrorists.[22] When people persuade themselves that war is the only way of pursuing right (like Jihadists on the other side) self-righteousness sets in, and law gets sidelined. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants (not at all a concern to al-Qaeda) is not decisive when one chooses to conduct operations in which 'collateral damage' is unavoidable: 'military necessity' rules. As a result,

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[19] Schoenbaum, *The Path Not Taken*, p. 121.
[20] Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want. Understanding the Terrorist Threat* (London: John Murray, 2006), p. 242; also, Patricia J. Williams, 'Peace, Poetry and Pentagonese', in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds.), *Worlds in Collision. Terror and the Future of Global Order* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 336–47.
[21] See Donald A. Wells, 'How Much Can the "Just War" Justify?', *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 66(4), 1969, pp. 819–29.
[22] Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, 'Worlds in Collision', in Booth and Dunne, *Worlds in Collision*, p. 13; see also, in the same volume, Williams, 'Peace, Poetry and Pentagonese'.

the civilian death-toll in the War on Terror inexorably rises. Meanwhile, unacceptable practices in the treatment of prisoners have been revealed. The Pentagon felt justified in conducting 'renditions', which involve turning over prisoners to compliant associate states where torture can be inflicted, more or less out of sight and mind.[23] The immediate US reaction to 9/11 was understandably (and rightly) clothed in the sense of injustice that comes from suffering mass murder out of a clear blue sky; but as the 'war' has proceeded, the reaction has increasingly failed the conventional test of 'proportionality'. The death and injury of hundreds of thousands of civilians have already been caused in excess of the numbers who suffered in the United States on 9/11; and many more will suffer in this 'long war', which is threatened to continue for perhaps a generation (even if a new president quietly drops the rhetoric associated with the Bush War on Terror). Law, not war, should have been the heart of the response to 9/11 from the beginning. In the struggle against terrorism, aspects of which undoubtedly must involve violence, long-term political success requires that prisoners are treated according to the highest standards, that the temptation is resisted of allowing 'anti-terrorism' to overrule humanity, and that the lives of innocents in all lands are measured equally. Terrorists begin to lose when whatever support they have ebbs away; they therefore begin to win when their victims increase that support by dismantling their own commitment to justice, democracy, liberty, law, and virtue.

A law-governed world is one of the conditions for world security. Among those whose interests it serves are states and groups of states that are presently dominant but may not be in future.[24] Self-interest and collective interest point here in the same direction, adding yet further weight to the criticism of those who do not show international law appropriate respect. The challenge has been summed up by Philip Allott as follows: 'International Society . . . chose to be an unsocial society creating itself separately from the development of its subordinate societies, ignoring the ideal of democracy, depriving itself of the possibility of using social power, especially legal relations to bring about the survival and prospering of the whole human race'. To meet the challenge, international society must reconceive itself, 'using social power, and especially legal relations'.[25]

[23] Schoenbaum, *The Path Not Taken*, p. 255.
[24] Note the principles advanced by Schoenbaum, *ibid.*, pp. 302–5.
[25] Philip Allott, *Eunomia: A New Order for a New World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 417.

4. Human rights

Those who wish for a world of human rights must not connive in human wrongs. In the conduct of its War on Terror, the Bush administration after 2001 committed 'systemic violations of domestic and international human rights laws'.[26] Torture was practised, though it is a technique a civilised society must reject whatever the provocation or temptation.[27] When considering any potential instrument of policy, whether torture or nuclear strategy, it is critical to consider not only what one's actions *might* do to the enemy, but also what they *are* doing to oneself. In this regard, the photographs of Pfc. Lynndie England and the hooded, naked Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib made public in 2004 spoke volumes. In Guantánamo, during the same period, a 'variety of forms of physical and mental torture' were employed against 'enemy combatants'.[28] The list of 'techniques' carried out against prisoners at that infamous location should be appended as a footnote to all the fine-sounding rhetoric of the Bush administration about human rights. In his Second Inaugural Address in 2005, President Bush said that justice starts with legitimacy, which, as summarised by Schoenbaum, 'means democracy, liberty, and an end to tyranny everywhere in the world'.[29] Tyranny will not be eradicated from human society through the methods of tyrants.

To ask for consistency on human rights is not a counsel of perfection. It is good politics. As it is, the exposure of abuses by agents of the US government has eroded the legitimacy of its case in its struggle against terrorism, because the appalling behaviour that has been exposed appears to justify the accusations of its enemies, and so swell their support, if only passively in many cases. Nor is my argument a counsel of perfection in the sense that I am asking for behaviour that is impossible. There are indeed models for consistent and noble behaviour in US history; they existed, and so are possible. One notable case was an episode in the country's very foundation, when more Americans died in British prison ships than in all the battles of the Revolutionary War.[30] The British tried to excuse their callous treatment of prisoners on the grounds that they were 'merely rebels'. General George Washington, though outraged at the treatment his men were receiving, did not respond in kind

[26] Schoenbaum, *The Path Not Taken*, p. 255.
[27] Rosemary Foot, 'Torture: The Struggle over a Peremptory Norm in a Counter-Terrorist Era', *International Relations*, vol. 20(2), 2006, pp. 131–51; see also Michael Ignatieff, 'If Torture Works . . .', *Prospect*, no. 121, November 2006, pp. 34–7.
[28] Schoenbaum, *The Path Not Taken*, p. 255.   [29] *Ibid.*, p. 302.
[30] The account below, including the quotations, is taken from Richardson, *What Terrorists Want*, pp. 250–1.

when his own forces captured 221 British prisoners at Princeton. He instructed the officer in charge: 'Treat them with humanity, and let them have no reason to complain of our copying the brutal example of the British army in their treatment of our unfortunate brethren.' Washington taught his men that the principles (ends) for which they were fighting had to be respected in every action (means). For George Washington, ends/means were related non-dualistically. For that Washington there would have been no Abu Ghraib or Bagram or Guantánamo or rendition. The disrespect shown to prisoners in the Bush presidency has, in Richardson's words, 'seriously undermined America's legitimacy in the eyes of its allies and the non-committed and confirmed its perfidy in the eyes of everyone else'. The failure of the White House to repudiate aspects of its policies conclusively, 'by holding the most senior people responsible', has increased the number of recruits to terrorism, discouraged others from 'lifting a finger' to help the United States, and made more difficult the task of 'driving a wedge between the terrorists and the communities that produce them'. George Washington/George W. Bush? The Princeton 221/Abu Ghraib? The Revolutionary War/the War on Terror? Ends and means? QED.

5. Out of/into Africa

The discussion so far has focused on the divorce between means and ends in the context of political and legal issues. I want to finish by returning to the economic dimension, and illustrate it from sub-Saharan Africa, a huge area that is witness to daily brutality, distress, and abject leadership. It also contains amazing promise, great variety, and infinite humanity. Indeed, the invention of humanity began in Africa, and if globalisation is to be humanised, Africa is its biggest and most poignant test.

The leaders of the world try to talk movingly about Africa.[31] In practice, however, words and actions, and ends and means are frequently strangers.[32] In 2005 Anthony Payne drew attention to the fact that Africa after 2002 had been accorded 'a measure of priority in the politics of

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[31] Tony Blair was central to promoting Africa's importance in the UK's foreign policy priorities (and also played a leading role internationally); see Paul D. Williams, *British Foreign Policy under New Labour, 1997–2005* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 'Healing a Scar on the World's Conscience?', pp. 75–96.

[32] See Royal African Society, *A Message to World Leaders: What About the Damage We Do to Africa?* (London: Royal African Society, June 2005): 'It's not just about thinking up good things we should do to Africa – it's about the bad things we should stop doing'. See also the 'Royal African Society's Response to the Consultation Paper' (issued by the

aid', but then correctly predicted that the upcoming Gleneagles summit would 'provide one further moment when Africa will, albeit briefly, be the focus of global concern'. In face of a history of such fleeting moments, it is tempting to give way to 'Afro-pessimism'. The problems of Africa have not only been the result of the ambitions of outsiders; post-independence Africa has often had to suffer leaders who were either too weak or too strong for their country's own good. The result has been that this continent, characterised by so much variety in so many things, has shared a depressingly similar history. This was put with heart-rending simplicity by the Biafran novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie: 'how similar the histories of many African countries are, how passionately people believed in ideas that would disappoint them, in people that would betray them, in futures that would elude them'.[33]

As long as business-as-usual continues, the 'African renaissance', long talked about, will remain a dream. Globalisation has not produced the positive results promised. Starting in the 1980s 'structural adjustment programmes' were tried and failed.[34] Then, neoliberal fundamentalism was reformed into 'adjustment with a human face', but to little better effect.[35] In 2000–1 the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) became the next 'big idea', seeking to halve poverty in Africa by 2015, based on a mixture of conventional neoliberal ideas mixed with a political strategy aimed at getting the euphemistically labelled 'development partners' to 'put their money in the same place as their mouths'.[36] In the event, corruption, unaccountable governments, human rights abuses, and war have continued across the continent. In 2002 President Bush signed a pledge to 'make concrete efforts' to provide 0.7 per cent of US national income to assist the world's poor. Three years later, the figure was 0.15 per cent.[37] Ends and means? Follow the money, not the words.

Another test of the world turning its back on Africa has been the lack of attention generally given to 'Africa's Great War' in the Democratic Republic of Congo, marked by so many intervening neighbours,

Commission for Africa), November 2004: www.royalafricansociety.org (I thank Paul Williams for drawing these documents to my attention).
[33] Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, 'Truth and Lies', *The Guardian*, 16 September 2006.
[34] See the verdict of a senior UNICEF officer: Ian Hopwood, 'Africa: Crisis and Challenge', in Ken Booth (ed.), *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 247–69.
[35] Anthony Payne, *The Global Politics of Unequal Development* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 38.
[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 163–4.
[37] Jeffrey D. Sachs, 'The Class System of Catastrophe', *Time*, 10 January 2005.

so much plunder, so much violence, so many victims, and so much external neglect.[38] It is unimaginable that such a Great War could have taken place on any other continent and be met by so much indifference on the part of the so-called international community. Together, the failings of governments within the continent, and the interests pursued by those outside, have conspired to commit swathes of Africa to a brutal fate. Occasionally, some outsiders (other than the NGOs struggling to give development a human face) have sat up and listened when global celebrities have tried to sing Africa into their lives, or when they have used it as an exotic background. Yet, as the acute reader of world affairs Mary Riddell has lamented: 'God help Africa if death, poverty and starvation are only visible to the West if refracted through a prism of borrowed celebrity'.[39]

For Africa, as with some other parts of the developing world, 'freedom' from colonisation did not prove to be enough.[40] Africa echoes with the warnings of 1960s 'dependency theorists' who (focusing originally on South America) pointed to the way in which the former colonial world had achieved the trappings of political independence, but actually continued to exist in a condition of economic dependence. Africa is not all gloom, however. At times, some states were declared to be relatively successful – Tanzania, Botswana, and Uganda, for example – but rarely have achievements been sustained. Malawi maintained free elections and a free press for a decade, then food crises got worse, testing Sen's influential claim about the relationship between dictatorship and famine. The assumption that grew in the 1980s that more democracy might be the solution to famine did not necessarily work twenty years later, when the chronic problem of food shortages became exacerbated by climate change, with parts of Africa drying out. Climate change, of course, is largely the result of the excesses of the rich world: once again, Africa is not primarily the cause of its problems, but the victim of the behaviour of others. And Jeffrey D. Sachs, director of the Earth Institute, Columbia University, reminds us that even catastrophes have unequal impact: 'What the rich world suffers as hardships the poor world often suffers as mass death.'[41]

The absence of strong and embedded institutions in many African states contributes to the continent's immiseration. Whereas countries

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[38] Guy Arnold, *Africa. A Modern History* (London: Atlantic Books, 2006), pp. 885–902.
[39] Mary Riddell, 'The Politics of Bob', *The Observer*, 1 January 2006.
[40] Joshua Hammer, 'Freedom Is Not Enough', *Time*, 14 November 2005.
[41] Sachs, 'Class System of Catastrophe'.

in the West have some hope of coping with bad leaders, because the institutions are bigger than personalities, this is not the case in much of Africa.[42] Prime Minister Zenawi of Ethiopia, for example, a member of Tony Blair's 2004 Commission for Africa – another big idea for Africa, modelled on the Brandt Commission – pledged to run free and fair elections, but according to one report, when the time came he 'did not appear to have thought about the possibility of losing'. He did indeed hold elections, but they were marred by rigging and intimidation, and he charged opposition leaders with treason.[43] Western leaders are certainly not alone in divorcing words and deeds, and ends and means.

The immiseration of much of Africa is obviously not a condition that can be eradicated overnight, but actions equivalent to a more humane globalisation can begin at once, bringing ends/means into harmony. The challenge for individuals, societies, and governments outside the continent is not simply to pile charity into Africa, though it has a role, but to help where possible develop an ethics of autonomy along the lines suggested by Richard Sennett (chapter 1), involving non-demeaning assistance and the strengthening of *their* autonomy rather than the exercising of *our* sense of pity. The aim is for institutions to help individuals achieve self-affirming respect.[44] It is then up to Africa.[45] The challenge is enormous, requiring revolutions in the mind, as well as material redistribution. If it is not done, if means and ends stay divorced, then Africa will remain, as Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie has said, a story of 'what happens when the shiny things we once believed in begin to rust before our eyes'.[46]

Beliefs and norms

> I will humanise even the enemy. I don't see Jews as devils or angels
> but as human beings. Mahmoud Darwish[47]

The marriage of means/ends is a key to trust-building, which in turn is a key to successful emancipatory politics; yet trust is a concept that has been almost entirely ignored in international relations theorising.[48] But

[42] Simon Robinson, 'Africa's Game of Follow the Leader', *Time*, 5 December 2005.
[43] Katy Guest, 'March of Democracy Falters in Africa', *The Independent*, 15 November 2005.
[44] Richard Sennett, *Respect. The Formation of Character in a World of Inequality* (London: Allen Lane, 2003), pp. 101–26, 247–63.
[45] A fair account of the obstacle of corruption is given by Arnold, *Africa*, pp. 921–39.
[46] Adichie, 'Truth and Lies'.
[47] Maya Jaggi, 'Mahmoud Darwish. Poet of the Arab World', *The Guardian*, 8 June 2002.
[48] Booth and Wheeler, *Security Dilemma*, ch. 9.