6 Three cultures of anarchy

In chapter 5 I argued that states are intentional, corporate actors whose identities and interests are in important part determined by domestic politics rather than the international system. Within domestic politics states are still socially constructed, of course, but this is a different level of construction; relative to the international system states are self-organizing facts. This means that if we are interested in the question of how the states *system* works, rather than in how its elements are constructed, we will have to take the existence of states as given, just as sociologists have to take the existence of people as given to study how society works. Systemic theory cannot problematize the state all the way down,[1] in short, since that would change the subject from a theory of the states system to a theory of the state. The fact that state identities and interests are at least partly exogenous to the system, in turn, satisfies the first principle of individualist approaches to systemic theory, like Neorealism and Neoliberalism. However, these theories usually make the much broader assumption that *all* state identities and interests are exogenous, which does not follow. The fact that state agents are not constructed by system structures all the way down does not mean they are not constructed by them to a significant extent. The per se individuality of states may be given outside the system, but the meanings or *terms* of that individuality are given within. Having accepted a key individualist constraint on systemic theorizing, in this chapter I show that a holist approach can still tell us a lot about the structure of international politics which would elude a pure individualism.

I assume at the outset that this structure is an anarchy, defined as

[1] Cf. Ashley (1984), Campbell (1992).

the absence of centralized authority. Disparities of power between Great and Small Powers raise doubts about this assumption on the centralization side, and states' acceptance of international norms raise more on the authority side. These questions highlight the limits of the "anarchy problematique" in IR scholarship,[2] but I shall set them aside for this chapter. Anarchy poses a distinctive and important problem of order for international politics, to which a constructivist approach suggests some new solutions.

Debates about the nature of the international system are in important part about the causal powers of anarchic structures. Under this heading I address two questions in this chapter, what might be called the variation question and the construction question.[3]

The first is whether anarchy is compatible with more than one kind of structure and therefore "logic." It is important here to distinguish between micro- and macro-level structures (chapter 4, pp. 145–157), between what Waltz calls the domains of "foreign policy" and "international politics." Everyone agrees that micro- or interaction-level anarchic structures vary. Some are peaceful, others warlike. The US and Russia interact under anarchy, and so did the US and the Soviet Union. Few would deny that their structures of interaction differ. The real question is whether the fact of anarchy creates a tendency for all such interactions to realize a single logic at the macro-level. In the Neorealist view they do: anarchies are inherently self-help systems that tend to produce military competition, balances of power, and war. Against this I argue that anarchy can have at least three kinds of structure at the macro-level, based on what kind of roles – enemy, rival, and friend – dominate the system. Adapting language from Martin Wight and the English School, I will call these structures Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian,[4] although in doing so I claim no close adherence to their views; the labels are intended merely as metaphors or stylized representations. I argue that only the Hobbesian structure is a truly self-help system, and as such there is no such thing as a "logic of anarchy."[5]

The other question is whether the international system constructs states. Do anarchic structures affect state identities and interests, or merely their behavior (see chapter 1)? Rationalist models assume that

[2] Ashley (1988); see also Alker (1996: 355–393).
[3] On the importance of distinguishing these issues see Lamborn (1997).
[4] See Wight (1991). [5] Buzan, Jones, and Little (1993).

only the behavior of states is affected by system structure, not their identities and interests. Against this I argue the holist hypothesis that the structure of international politics also has construction effects on states. I focus on causal effects in chapter 7; here I address mostly constitutive ones. If such effects exist this would have important – and given that constructivism is often associated with ease of social change, perhaps unexpected – implications for the possibility of change in international politics: actors whose interests are constituted by a structure will have a stake in it which will make it more stable than would otherwise be the case. Showing that identities and interests are socially constructed may reveal new possibilities for change, but those constructions can also be powerful sources of inertia if they are institutionalized.

Apart from its implications for change, the answer to the construction question also bears on the variation question, since if anarchic structures have no construction effects then it is more likely that anarchy does not have a single logic. Game theory teaches us that the outcomes of interaction stem from configurations of desires and beliefs, which can vary from "Harmony" all the way to "Deadlock."[6] If the content of these games is not constrained by anarchic structures then any claims about the logic(s) of anarchy will depend on producing behavioral convergence despite potentially infinite variation in desires and beliefs. There may be such convergence, but it is hard to show. In this light it is not surprising that Waltz hypothesizes that anarchy tends to produce "like units" (a construction hypothesis), though for good measure he also assumes that states are by nature self-regarding and security seeking. These moves eliminate much of the possible variation in interests that could undermine the idea of a single logic of anarchy. By the same token, it is not surprising that Liberals, among the key opponents of Realism, take the individualist view that state interests are determined by societal factors, and therefore highly variable, with the states system relegated to a domain of strategic interaction with no construction effects.[7] This would force Realists to make the case for a single logic on the basis of behavioral effects alone, which the variety of domestic forms ensures will be difficult.

The choice between Realism and Liberalism is often seen as one

[6] For a good discussion of varieties of games see Snyder and Diesing (1977).
[7] See especially Moravcsik (1997).

between "top–down" vs. "bottom–up" theorizing, between the view that international politics contains a single logic which depends in no way on its elements, and the view that the logic of anarchy is reducible entirely to its elements. In effect, we can either study structure or study agents; either anarchic structure has one logic or none at all. I defend a third possibility: (1) anarchic structures do construct their elements, but (2) these structures vary at the macro-level and can therefore have multiple logics. Anarchy *as such* is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic; anarchies only acquire logics as a function of the structure of what we put inside them. This accommodates Liberalism's emphasis on domestic politics, but within a structural approach to the international system.

The key to this argument is conceptualizing structure in social rather than material terms. When IR scholars today use the word structure they almost always mean Waltz's materialist definition as a distribution of capabilities. Bipolar and multipolar distributions have different dynamics at the level of foreign policy, but they do not construct states differently or generate different logics of anarchy at the macro-level. Defining structure in social terms admits those possibilities, and without any real loss of parsimony, since I believe that Waltz's theory itself presupposes a social structure, a Lockean one (see below and chapter 3). To say that a structure is "social" is to say, following Weber, that actors take each other "into account" in choosing their actions. This process is based on actors' *ideas* about the nature and roles of Self and Other, and as such social structures are "distributions of ideas" or "stocks of knowledge."[8] Some of these ideas are shared, others are private. Shared ideas make up the subset of social structure known as "culture" (on these definitions see chapter 4, pp. 140–142). In principle Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian structures might be constituted entirely by private ideas, but in practice they are usually constituted by shared ones. In this chapter I address the nature and effects of shared ideas only. In what follows, therefore, the structure of the international system is its "culture"[9] even though in reality social structure is more than that. Following

[8] The notion of societies as "stocks" of knowledge is developed by Berger and Luckmann (1966) and Turner (1988).

[9] On culture at the level of the international system see Pasic (1996), Meyer, *et al.* (1997), and Bukovansky (1999b). The concept of culture is more commonly used with reference to unit-level factors; see Johnston (1995), Katzenstein, ed. (1996), and Weldes, *et al.*, eds. (1999).

Mlada Bukovansky, I call this its "political" culture.[10] Its political culture is the most fundamental fact about the structure of an international system, giving meaning to power and content to interests, and thus the thing we most need to know to explain a "small number of big and important things."[11]

Showing that anarchic structures are cultures does not show that they construct states. To see this it is useful to consider three reasons why actors may observe cultural norms: because they are forced to, because it is in their self-interest, and because they perceive the norms as legitimate.[12] These explanations correspond roughly to Neorealist, Neoliberal, and Idealist [constructivist?] theories of "the difference that norms make" in international life,[13] and perhaps for that reason they are often seen as mutually exclusive. However, I believe it is more useful to see them as reflecting three different "degrees" to which a norm can be *internalized*, and thus as generating three different pathways by which the same structure can be produced – "force," "price," and "legitimacy." It is an empirical question which pathway occurs in a given case. It is only with the third degree of internalization that actors are really "constructed" by culture; up to that point culture is affecting just their behavior or beliefs about the environment, not who they are or what they want. There has been relatively little work in IR on the internalization of norms[14] and so I address all three degrees below, but since the third is the distinctively constructivist hypothesis it is there that I will concentrate.

The next section defends two assumptions of the subsequent discussion. I then examine the structure of Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian cultures in turn, showing how the degree to which they are internalized affects the difference that they make. As a structural analysis I say little in this chapter about questions of system process (see chapter 7). Thus, even though I show that the structure of anarchy varies with relationships between states, I do not argue here that "anarchy is what states make of it." In conclusion I address the

[10] Bukovansky (1999b); cf. Almond and Verba (1963).

[11] Waltz (1986: 329).

[12] See Spiro (1987: 163–164), D'Andrade (1995: 227–228), and Hurd (1999); cf. Henkin (1979: 49–50).

[13] Cf. Hasenclever, *et. al.* (1997). I received this volume too late to incorporate into my treatment here, but their analysis makes an excellent starting point for further discussion.

[14] For exceptions see Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990), Muller (1993), Cortell and Davis (1996); cf. Wendt and Barnett (1993).

question of progress over time, suggesting that although there is no guarantee that international time will move forward toward a Kantian culture, at least it is unlikely to move backward.

Structure and roles under anarchy

The approach to structural theorizing used in this chapter is discussed in chapter 4 and will not be reiterated here. However, it has two implications for international theory that challenge deeply held assumptions in IR scholarship, and so to prevent misunderstanding some elaboration seems appropriate. The first implication is that there is no relationship between the extent of shared ideas or culture in a system and the extent of cooperation. Most IR scholarship assumes that there is such a relationship. I believe there is not. Culture may constitute conflict or cooperation. The second implication is that the concept of "role" should be a key concept in structural theorizing about the international system. Most IR scholarship assumes that roles are unit-level properties with no place in structural theory. I believe this misunderstands the nature of roles, which are properties of structures, not agents. The culture of an international system is based on a structure of roles. To defend these claims I begin with the Neorealist definition of structure and its basis in a particular view of the problem of order.

There are two problems of order in social life.[15] One is getting people to work together toward mutually beneficial ends like reducing violence or increasing trade, and for this reason it is sometimes known as the "cooperation problem."[16] This is what political theorists going back to Hobbes have usually meant by the problem of order, and it justifiably has been central to IR scholars and foreign policymakers alike, given the difficulties of cooperation under anarchy and potential costs of failure. There is another problem of order, however, what might be called the "sociological" as opposed to "political" problem, which is creating stable patterns of behavior, whether cooperative *or* conflictual. Regularities are plentiful in nature, where they are determined primarily by material forces. These matter in society as well, but social regularities are determined primarily by shared ideas that enable us to predict each other's behavior.

[15] See Elster (1989: 1–2) and Wrong (1994: 10–12).
[16] For example, Axelrod (1984), Oye, ed. (1986).

Following Hobbes, scholars in the Realist tradition have tended to argue that shared ideas can only be created by centralized authority. Since in anarchy there is no such authority states must assume the worst about each other's intentions, that others will violate norms as soon as it is in their interest to do so, which forces even peace-loving states to play power politics. Any shared ideas that emerge will be fragile and fleeting, subject to potentially violent change with changes in the distribution of power. The only shared idea that can be stable under such conditions is that "war may at any moment occur,"[17] but for Realists this is simple prudence, not culture. In the Realist view, therefore, if anarchy displays any order in the second, sociological sense it will be because of material forces, not shared ideas, not unlike order in nature.

These Hobbesian considerations seem to underlie Waltz's materialist definition of structure. Waltz defines structure along three dimensions: the principle according to which units are ordered, the differentiation of units and their functions, and the distribution of capabilities. In international politics the ordering principle is anarchy, for Waltz a constant, and unlike domestic politics the units are functionally undifferentiated, so this dimension drops out. This leaves the distribution of capabilities as the only variable dimension of international structure. Patterns of amity and enmity and international institutions, both of which are based on shared ideas, are seen as unit-level phenomena, presumably because in anarchy there can be no such ideas at the macro-level. Waltz does not seem to have set out specifically to be a "materialist," but purging shared ideas from his definition of structure makes his theory reminiscent of the more "Fundamentalist," technological determinist forms of Marxism, which try to derive relations of production from the forces.[18]

Hedley Bull has called part of this reasoning into question.[19] Bull pointed out that Realists are making a "domestic analogy" which assumes that shared ideas at the international level must have the same foundation – centralized authority – that they have at the domestic. If that were true then because it is an anarchy, the international system could be at most a "system" (parts interacting as a whole), not a "society" (common interests and rules). Bull argued that the analogy does not hold, that at least limited forms of inter-state cooperation based on shared ideas – respecting property, keeping

[17] Waltz (1959: 232). [18] See Cohen (1978). [19] Bull (1977: 46–51).

promises, and limiting violence – are possible, and as such there can be an "anarchical society" of the kind envisioned by Grotius or Locke. Neoliberals have extended this insight to the study of a whole range of cooperation in international regimes. Although neither Bull nor Neoliberals conclude that we should define the structure of the international system in social or cultural terms, this seems to be a natural implication of saying that the system is a "society."

In contrast to Waltz, then, a reading of Bull suggests that the structure of anarchy can vary, resulting in distinct logics and tendencies. My argument in this chapter builds directly on Bull's.[20] Yet Bull seems to agree with Waltz on one crucial point and this is where we differ: for Bull the movement from system to society (and perhaps on to community) is a function of a growth in shared knowledge. Like Realists, Bull associates highly conflictual anarchies ("systems") with a state of *nature*, in which no shared ideas exist, and more cooperative anarchies ("societies") with the presence of shared ideas. Realists and Grotians may disagree about the prospects for the emergence of shared ideas under anarchy, but they agree that shared ideas are associated with cooperation. In effect, both sides are reducing the sociological problem of order to the political: assuming that shared ideas depend on working together toward a common end. That suggests that in the absence of cooperation whatever order exists in the international system must be due to material rather than cultural factors. On that view, the relevance of an idealist approach goes up and a materialist one goes down, as the system moves from conflict toward cooperation. This seems to lead to a natural conclusion, drawn most explicitly by Buzan, Jones, and Little, that offers the best of both theories: treat shared ideas as a distinct "sector" of the international system (the "societal" sector), where cooperation rules and an idealist analysis may be appropriate, and leave the more conflictual, economic, political, and strategic sectors to materialists.

This framing of the issue shortchanges idealists and materialists both, the former because shared ideas may constitute conflict, the latter because material forces may induce cooperation. The mistake here is thinking that "culture" (shared knowledge) is the same thing as "society" (cooperation). Shared knowledge and its various manifestations – norms, rules, etc. – are analytically neutral with respect to cooperation and conflict. As Nina Tannenwald says about norms,

[20] For other similarities see Dunne (1995).



Figure 4 The multiple realization of international culture

norms may be "good" or "bad"; they may tell states that it is heinous to make war, or that it is glorious.[21] In a recent critique of Bull, Alan James[22] makes much the same argument about rules, which he points out are necessary for all but the most elementary forms of interaction. Conversely, there is nothing about the absence of shared knowledge, a world of only material forces, that necessarily implies a war of all against all. The difference between Hobbesian and Grotian worlds is not about the presence of shared ideas. Shared ideas can solve the sociological problem of order even if they do not solve the political one. The significance of this should become clear by considering figure 4,[23] which summarizes the framework of this chapter.

When it is not busy trying to reduce anarchy to a single logic, as in Neorealism, IR scholarship tends to move along the diagonal from bottom left to top right, implicitly reducing the role of shared ideas to cooperation. This assumes that logics of anarchy are a function of how deeply culture is internalized. I argue this is a mistake. Hobbesian logics can be generated by deeply shared ideas, and Kantian logics by only weakly shared ones. Each logic of anarchy is *multiply realizable*: the same effect can be reached through different causes.[24] Which pathway realizes a given anarchy is an empirical question. All nine cells of figure 4 should be in play in international theory, not just those along the diagonal.

[21] Tannenwald (1996: 48); for examples of good and bad norms see Elster (1989: 97–151).
[22] James (1993).
[23] I leave out of this picture the possibility that an anarchy might be based on no shared knowledge at all.
[24] On multiple realizability see chapter 4 and Most and Starr (1984).

This has two important implications. The first is that the amount of conflict in a system does not bear on the relative utility of idealist and materialist theories. Conflict is no more evidence for materialism than cooperation is for idealism; it all depends on how conflict and cooperation are constituted. As someone concerned to advance a constructivist analysis of phenomena that many scholars treat as a Realist monopoly, I am most interested in the upper-left cells of figure 4, but there are equally interesting neglected possibilities for Realists in the bottom right. The second implication concerns structural change. Realist pessimism notwithstanding, it is easier to escape a Hobbesian world whose culture matters relatively little, and notwithstanding Idealist optimism, harder to create a Kantian one based on deeply shared beliefs. It is Realists who should think that cultural change is easy, not constructivists, because the more deeply shared ideas are internalized – the more they "matter" – the stickier the structure they constitute will be.

This suggests a rethinking of Waltz's definition of structure. In order to make clear that structure contains both material and ideational elements let me begin by building on Dan Deudney to make an analogy between modes of production and "modes of *de*struction."[25] On the material side of the latter are "forces of destruction": technological artifacts like spears, tanks, and ICBMs that have the ability to kill people and destroy property. These vary quantitatively, which is captured by Waltz's "distribution of capabilities," and qualitatively, which is reflected in the changing balance between offensive versus defensive weapons technologies and in Deudney's[26] "composition" of power. The strength of Realism lies in assessing the social possibilities of these artifacts.

As I argued in chapter 3, however, the *pro*bability that any given possibility will be realized depends on ideas and the interests they constitute. Five hundred British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the US than five North Korean ones because of the shared understandings that underpin them. What gives meaning to the forces of destruction are the "*relations* of destruction" in which they are embedded: the shared ideas, whether cooperative or conflictual, that structure violence between states. These ideas constitute the roles or terms of individuality through which states interact. The concept of

[25] Deudney (1999); also see Mouzelis (1989) on "modes of political domination."
[26] Deudney (1993).

"terms of individuality," which I borrow from constructivists in social psychology,[27] plays the same function in this model as "principles of differentiation" does in Waltz's. Both concern the ways in which agents are constituted by structures. Waltz drops these principles from his theory, and with them all possibility of giving it a social dimension, because he assumes that differentiation must be functional. But functional differentiation in social life is in important part based on role differentiation, and roles may be asymmetric *or* symmetric. The role of "enemy," for example, constitutes identities even though enemies are functionally equivalent. The generality of Waltz's intuition becomes clear in Ruggie's work on sovereignty, which combines Waltz's language of differentiation with the language of terms of individuality to show how the meaning of sovereignty – a form of subjectivity in which differentiation is spatial rather than functional – varies historically.[28] Until he dropped principles of differentiation, in other words, Waltz had an at least implicitly cultural theory of structure.

Apart from making explicit and extending that theory to role differentiation, however, I am also reversing his materialist hypothesis about the relationship between ideas and material forces. The analogy to Marxism is again helpful here. In contrast to Waltz's "Fundamentalist" assumption which reduces relations to forces of destruction, and also in contrast to Neoliberalism's Structural Marxist assumption that ideas are a superstructure "relatively autonomous" from but determined in the last instance by the material base (see chapter 3, pp. 136–137), in my view no necessary relationship between forces and relations of destruction – between nature and culture – can be specified a priori. In some cases material conditions are decisive, in others it will be ideas. It is my expectation that empirically we will find that ideas usually are far more important. There sometimes may be an international equivalent of a "hotel fire" that effectively eliminates a meaningful role for ideas, but in most cases it will be ideas that give meaning to material conditions rather than the other way around. Rather than follow Neorealists in focusing first on material structure, therefore, I believe that if we want to say a small number of big and important things about world politics we would do better to focus first on states' ideas and the interests they constitute, and only then worry about who has how many guns.

[27] See, for example, Turner and Oakes (1986: 239), Sampson (1988), and Shotter (1990).
[28] Ruggie (1993).

Shared understandings about violence vary from the general ("kill or be killed") to the specific (use white flags to surrender). While each may be studied individually, my proposal, adapted from Bull and Wight, is that they tend to cluster into three cultures with distinct logics and tendencies, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian.[29] I shall treat these cultures as ideal types, although I believe all three have been instantiated at different times and places in international history. I do not claim that they exhaust the possible forms of anarchy, only that they are particularly salient. They may be found in regional subsystems of the international system – Buzan's "security complexes"[30] – or in the system as a whole. Finally, although they may be affected by cultures at the domestic and/or transnational level, the cultures of interest here are states system-centric. This means that even if states' domestic cultures have little in common, as in Huntington's "clash of civilizations,"[31] the states *system* could still have one culture that affected the behavior of its elements.

A key aspect of any cultural form is its role structure, the configuration of subject positions that shared ideas make available to its holders.[32] Subject positions are constituted by representations of Self and Other as particular kinds of agents related in particular ways, which in turn constitute the logics and reproduction requirements of distinct cultural systems (schools, churches, polities, and so on).[33] The reproduction of these systems only occurs when roles are filled by real people, but since different people can fill the same position over time and realize it in different ways, roles cannot be reduced to individuals. Roles are attributes of structures, not agents. In principle these could be micro-structures, but I shall focus on roles as properties of macro-structures, as *collective* representations. Although in most cultures roles are functionally differentiated, anarchy makes it difficult to sustain role asymmetry until the problem of violence is mitigated,[34] and so I propose that at the core of each kind of anarchy is just one

[29] I have adapted these labels from Wight (e.g., 1991), although he used them to refer to *theories* (Realist, Rationalist, and Revolutionist, or, sometimes, Machiavellian, Grotian, and Kantian), while I will be using them to refer to real world *structures*, much as Bull (1977) used the terms "system" and "society."

[30] Buzan (1991). [31] Huntington (1993).

[32] The treatment of the concept of role below draws especially on symbolic interactionist ideas; see McCall and Simmons (1978), Stryker and Statham (1985), and Callero (1986).

[33] On the concept of subject position see Doty (1996) and Weldes (1999).

[34] Waltz (1979: 95–97); also see Elias (1982: 235).

subject position: in Hobbesian cultures it is "enemy," in Lockean "rival," and Kantian "friend." Each involves a distinct posture or orientation of the Self toward the Other with respect to the use of violence, which can be realized in multiple ways at the micro-level. The posture of enemies is one of threatening adversaries who observe no limits in their violence toward each other; that of rivals is one of competitors who will use violence to advance their interests but refrain from killing each other; and that of friends is one of allies who do not use violence to settle their disputes and work as a team against security threats.

The proposition that structures can be analyzed in terms of roles is hardly radical. Sociologists routinely think this way about structure, and it was no less a Realist than Carl Schmitt who argued that the friend–enemy distinction was the fundamental structure of the political.[35] Yet modern, structurally oriented Realists explicitly reject the incorporation of roles into structural theorizing on the grounds that roles are unit-level phenomena.[36] In doing so they receive support from an unlikely, "reductionist" quarter, foreign policy role theorists, who argue that the social structure of the international system does not contain thick enough shared expectations to support roles.[37] Discouraged by both sides from thinking structurally, when IR scholars talk about roles they are almost always referring to the domestically constituted beliefs of individuals or elites, i.e., unit-level properties.

The skeptics have a point. If foreign policy roles are defined as the beliefs of decision-makers or state elites then they cannot be structural phenomena in the *macro* sense, which is the only sense of structure that Neorealists recognize. The distribution of those beliefs is structural at what I have called the *micro-* or interaction-level sense, and in that capacity they constitute key ingredients in the international process, but that is precisely why Neorealists think roles are not "structural." As I indicated above, however, this is not how roles should be understood. Roles are structural positions, not actor beliefs. To be sure, in order for actors to enact and reproduce subject positions they have to incorporate them into their identities and interests, and

[35] Schmitt (1932/1976); for good introductions to this aspect of Schmitt's work see Schwab (1987) and Sartori (1989).

[36] For example, Buzan, Jones, and Little (1993: 46), Waltz (1979: passim); cf. Schroeder (1994: 124–9).

[37] Holsti (1970: 243).

in that way roles constitute unit-level properties, but role-*identities* are not the same thing as roles. Role-identities are subjective self-understandings; roles are the objective, collectively constituted positions that give meaning to those understandings. The former come and go as individuals take on or discard beliefs; the latter persist as long as someone fills them. Bill Clinton currently occupies the role of US President, and has taken on identities and interests that enable him to play the part, but whereas his identities and interests will presumably change when he leaves office, the position will live on. Similarly, in the nineteenth century, Great Britain played the role of "balancer" in Great Power politics,[38] but that was a property of the social structure of the Concert of Europe, not of Great Britain. Had no state filled that role the structure might not have survived.

The structure and tendencies of anarchic systems will depend on which of our three roles – enemy, rival, and friend – dominate those systems, and states will be under corresponding pressure to internalize that role in their identities and interests. As for Holsti's argument that shared ideas at the international level are not thick enough to support roles: if he is making the empirical claim that cultures of anarchy are never internalized deep enough to construct state interests, then he may be right (though I will argue otherwise). Like others operating along the diagonal line in figure 4, however, I suspect he is actually making a tacit assumption that shared ideas must be cooperative, which would mean that since there is not much cooperation in international politics there is no structural basis for roles. Once we recognize that culture does not imply cooperation we can see that roles belong in structural theories of world politics even if states have nothing more in common than the knowledge that they are enemies.

The Hobbesian culture

Although there is no necessary connection between a Hobbesian anarchy and Realism, it is a natural link to assume because this anarchy is a "hard case" for constructivism. Its high death rate makes it difficult for shared ideas to form, and if they do form it is still difficult to see why states would have the stake in them that is implied by the constructivist proposition that internalized ideas constitute identities and interests. Because it is a hard case and the first application of my

[38] Gulick (1955).

framework, I will pay more attention to this culture than to the others. The discussion is organized into three sections. The first section addresses the nature of enmity as a position for the Other and its implications for the posture of the Self. I then examine the logic and tendencies that result when this role dominates a system, the "war of all against all." My description of this condition is familiar; what is less traditional is my claim that the state of war is constituted by shared ideas, not by anarchy or human nature. The last section explores the three degrees to which this culture can be internalized.

Enmity

Enemies lie at one end of a spectrum of role relationships governing the use of violence between Self and Other, distinct in kind from rivals and friends. All three positions constitute social structures, insofar as they are based on representations of the Other in terms of which the posture of the Self is defined. As R.S. Perinbanayagam puts it, "[t]he other is the social-psychological form of that abstraction that sociologists and anthropologists call social structure."[39] By understanding how Self and Other are represented, therefore, we can explain (and predict) a great deal of what goes on in a social system. I look first at the representations of the Other in this position and then at its implications for the Self.

Enemies are constituted by representations of the Other as an actor who (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self. Taking its cue from Schmitt,[40] this is a narrower definition than one normally finds in IR, where "enemy" is often used to describe any violent antagonist, as in "Britain and Argentina were enemies during the Falklands War." Since my definition is based on a distinction that in turn distinguishes Hobbesian and Lockean cultures, it is important to be clear. The distinction concerns the perceived scope of the Other's intentions, in particular whether he is thought to be trying to kill or enslave the Self or merely trying to

[39] Perinbanayagam (1985: 135–136).

[40] Schmitt (1932/1976). As Schwab (1987) points out in a commentary on Schmitt, the notion that the Other will engage in unlimited violence is more accurately applied to the term "foe" than "enemy," but this meaning of the former has largely died out. On enemy images in IR see Wolfers (1962: 25–35), Finlay, *et al.* (1967), Volkan (1988), Rieber, ed. (1991), and Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995).

beat or steal from him. Enmity and rivalry both imply that the Other does not fully recognize the Self and therefore may act in a "revisionist" fashion toward it, but the object of recognition and revisionism is different. An enemy does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as a free subject at all, and therefore seeks to "revise" the latter's life or liberty (call this "deep" revisionism). A rival, in contrast, is thought to recognize the Self's right to life and liberty, and therefore seeks to revise only its behavior or property ("shallow" revisionism). Both impute to the Other aggressive intent, but the enemy's intentions are unlimited in nature, the rival's are limited.[41] This relates to the level of violence expected from the Other. Violence between enemies has no internal limits; whatever limits exist will be due solely to inadequate capabilities (a balance of power or exhaustion) or the presence of an external constraint (Leviathan). This is the kind of violence found in a state of nature. Violence between rivals, in contrast, is *self-limiting*, constrained by recognition of each other's right to exist. This is the kind of violence characteristic of "civilization," the essence of which Norbert Elias argues is self-restraint.[42]

Enemy images have a long pedigree, and some states continue to position each other in such terms today. The Greeks represented the Persians as "barbarians"; the Crusaders perceived the Turks as "infidels"; medieval Europeans feared their defeat at Liegnitz at the hands of the Mongols heralded Armageddon; later Europeans treated the peoples of the Americas as savages; conservatives thought civilization was threatened by the French Revolution; and, in our own century, we have the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust, the early Cold War, Northern Ireland, Pol Pot, Palestinian and Israeli fundamentalists, the Bosnian Civil War, Hutus and Tutsis – all based on representations of the Other as intent on destroying or enslaving the Self.

It is important to emphasize that this concept implies nothing about whether enemy images are justified. Some enemies are "real," in that the Other really does existentially threaten the Self, as the Nazis did the Jews, and others are "chimeras," as the Jews were to the Nazis.[43] This difference may affect the dynamics of enmity and whether it can be overcome, but it does not affect the reality of Hobbesian cultures.

[41] Herrmann and Fischerkeller (1995: 426). This seems to parallel the distinction between offensive and defensive Realism.

[42] Elias (1982). [43] Smith (1996).

Real or imagined, if actors think enemies are real then they are real in their consequences.[44]

Representing the Other as an enemy tends to have at least four implications for a state's foreign policy posture and behavior, which in turn generate a particular logic of interaction.

First, states will tend to respond to enemies by acting like deep revisionists themselves, i.e., they will try to destroy or conquer them. This does not necessarily mean their *interests* will be revisionist; a state might actually have status quo interests, but the threat of the enemy forces it to *behave* "as if" it were a deep revisionist, on the principle of "kill or be killed." Second, decision-making will tend to heavily discount the future and be oriented toward the worst-case. (Negative) possibilities rather than probabilities will dominate, which reduces the likelihood of reciprocating any cooperative moves made by the enemy. One might say that prospect theory rather than expected-utility theory will be the basis of "rational" behavior.[45] Third, relative military capabilities will be seen as crucial.[46] Since the enemy's revisionist intentions are "known," the state can use the enemy's capabilities to predict his behavior, on the assumption that he will attack as soon as he can win. Power becomes the key to survival, and as such even status quo states will vigorously arm themselves on the principle of "if you want peace, prepare for war." Enmity, in short, gives capabilities a particular *meaning*, which derives neither from their intrinsic properties nor from anarchy as such, but from the structure of the role relationship. Finally, if it comes to actual war, states will fight on the enemy's (perceived) terms. This means observing no limits on their own violence, since that would create a competitive disadvantage, unless it is clear that self-limitation is safe. And if war has not yet broken out but clearly will soon, states must also be prepared to preempt, especially if offensive technology is dominant, lest the enemy get a fatal advantage from a first strike.

What states facing a enemy must do, in sum, is engage in no-holds-barred power politics. It has become common practice in recent IR scholarship to refer to such behavior as "Realist." If Realism is taken to be merely a description of power politics then this practice is harmless, but taken as an *explanation* it invites confusion, since it

[44] Thomas and Thomas (1928: 572).
[45] On the significance of this distinction see Brooks (1997) and Levy (1997).
[46] See Grieco (1988).

suggests that the existence of power politics is somehow evidence for Realist theory. This cannot be the case, at least on any non-tautological definition of Realism; conflict is no more evidence for Realism than cooperation is for non-Realism. It all depends on what explains it. The account developed here explains power politics by reference to perceptions of Self and Other, and as such sees it as fundamentally social in the Weberian sense. I take Realism to be a theory that explains power politics ultimately by reference to material forces, whether biological or technological, and as such its view is not fundamentally social. In order to keep alive the possibility of meaningful theoretical disagreement, therefore, it seems better to follow Iain Johnston's practice of calling power political behavior "realpolitik" rather than "Realism."[47] The Realist tradition contains much descriptive wisdom about realpolitik, but this does not entail the truth of its explanation for realpolitik.

What Realism-as-description shows is that when the Other is an enemy the Self is forced to mirror back the representations it has attributed to the Other. Thus, unlike most roles in social life, which are constituted by functionally differentiated "counter"-roles (teacher–student, master–slave, patron–client), the role of enemy is symmetric, constituted by actors being in the same position simultaneously. Self mirrors Other, becomes *its* enemy, in order to survive. This of course will confirm whatever hostile intentions the *Other* had attributed to the Self, forcing it to engage in realpolitik of its own, which will in turn reinforce the Self's perception of the Other, and so on. Realpolitik, in short, is a self-fulfilling prophecy: its beliefs generate actions that confirm those beliefs.[48] This is not to say that realpolitik is the sole cause of conflict, such that in its absence states would be friends, since if states really do want to conquer each other then realpolitik is as much effect as cause. The point is that whether or not states really are existential threats to each other is in one sense not relevant, since once a logic of enmity gets started states will behave in ways that *make* them existential threats, and thus the behavior itself becomes part of the problem. This gives enemy-images a homeostatic quality that sustains the logic of Hobbesian anarchies.

[47] Johnston (1995). [48] Wendt (1992), Vasquez (1993), Alker (1996).

The logic of Hobbesian anarchy

Unlike foreign policy role theorists, who treat roles as qualities that states attribute to themselves and thus as properties of agents (what I would call role-*identities*), I have focused on the role attributed to the Other, and thus on role as a *position* in or property of a social structure. Like role theorists, however, I have so far treated enmity as an interaction- or micro-level phenomenon, as based on subjective images or perceptions. I did so partly for presentational reasons, but also because macro-level structures only exist in virtue of instantiations at the micro-level, which means that whatever logics the former have depend on actors acting in certain ways.

In most cases, however, micro-level role relationships are embedded in macro-level, *collective* representations. Collective representations have a life and logic of their own that cannot be reduced to actors' perceptions or behavior (chapter 4, pp. 150–165). As more and more members of a system represent each other as enemies, eventually a "tipping point"[49] is reached at which these representations take over the logic of the system. At this point actors start to think of enmity as a property of the *system* rather than just of individual actors, and so feel compelled to represent all Others as enemies simply because they are parts of the system. In this way the particular Other becomes Mead's "generalized Other,"[50] a structure of collective beliefs and expectations that persists through time even as individual actors come and go, and into the logic of which new actors are socialized. (The concepts of "discourse" and "hegemony" I take it have a similar, macro-level orientation.) It is in terms of positions within this structure that actors make attributions about Self and Other, rather than in terms of their actual qualities. The result is a logic of interaction based more on what actors know about their roles than on what they know about each other, enabling them to predict each other's behavior without knowing each other's "minds." This in turn generates emergent patterns of behavior at the macro-level. Collective representations are "frequency-dependent"[51] in that they depend for their existence on a sufficient number of representations and/or behaviors at the micro-level – the representation known as "Canada" only exists if enough people sustain

[49] Schelling (1978: 99–102); for a good illustration see Laitin (1998).
[50] Mead (1934: 154–156). [51] Boyd and Richerson (1980: 100).

it – but as long as that number remains above the tipping point collective representations will be relatively autonomous from or supervene on ideas in the heads of individuals. The logic and tendencies of the Hobbesian anarchy emerge at this macro-level of analysis.

The logic of the Hobbesian anarchy is well known: the "war of all against all" in which actors operate on the principle of *sauve qui peut* and kill or be killed. This is the true "self-help" system (by which I mean to suggest that the anarchy described by Waltz is not that; see below), where actors cannot count on each other for help or even to observe basic self-restraint. Survival depends solely on military power, which means that increases in the security of A necessarily reduce that of B, who can never be sure that A's capabilities are defensive. Security is a deeply competitive, zero-sum affair, and security dilemmas are particularly acute not because of the nature of weapons – the offense–defense balance – but because of intentions attributed to others.[52] Even if what states really want is security rather than power their collective beliefs force them to *act* as if they are power-seeking. This structure generates four "tendencies," macro-level patterns that will get realized unless they are blocked by countervailing forces.[53]

The first is endemic and unlimited warfare. This does not mean that states will constantly be at war, since material considerations may suppress the manifestation of this tendency for a time, but as long as states collectively represent each other in Hobbesian terms, war may quite literally "at any moment occur."[54] A second is the elimination of "unfit" actors: those not adapted for warfare, and those too weak militarily to compete. This means, on the one hand, as Waltz argues, that we should see a tendency toward functional isomorphism, with all political entities becoming "like units" (states) with similar war-fighting capabilities.[55] On the other hand, however – something Waltz does not predict – we should also see a high death rate among weak states. Since their territories will be conquered by the strong, this will generate a corresponding tendency toward empire-building and reduction in the overall number of political units – toward a concentration of power.[56] Partly counteracting this tendency is a third: states

[52] Herz (1950), Jervis (1978), Glaser (1997). If indeed they are even "dilemmas"; see Schweller (1996).

[53] This I take to be the Marxian understanding of tendencies; cf. Van Eeghan (1996).

[54] Waltz (1959: 232). [55] Waltz (1979). [56] Kaufman (1997: 117–123).

powerful enough to avoid elimination will balance each other's power.[57] However, in contrast to Waltz's view of balancing as the fundamental tendency of anarchy in general, the lack of inhibition and self-restraint in Hobbesian cultures suggests that balances of power there will be difficult to sustain, with the tendency toward consolidation being dominant in the long run. Finally, a Hobbesian system will tend to suck all of its members into the fray, making non-alignment or neutrality very difficult.[58] The principal exception will be states that are able to "hide" because of the material condition of geography (Switzerland in World War II), although geography's significance is itself subject to material changes in technology (nuclear weapons).

Although an ideal type, and perhaps never characteristic of the state of nature among individuals, the Hobbesian condition does describe significant portions of international history. International politics has often been characterized by endemic violence, isomorphic tendencies among units, a high rate of destruction and consolidation of units,[59] balancing when necessary, and little room for neutrality. This is significant given the cultural diversity of states systems, and lends support to the Realist view that in anarchy *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*. One can argue about how many of the past 5,000 years have been "Realist," but Mearsheimer's question is still important: why has this logic dominated international politics as often as it has?[60] I take up this question in chapter 7.

Three degrees of internalization

It is possible for a Hobbesian anarchy to have no culture at all. Here, all knowledge is private rather than shared. Hobbes' own, materialist portrayal of the state of nature and Bull's idea of "system" seem to be based on this assumption. The absence of shared culture has an interesting, perhaps counter-intuitive implication: the resulting warfare is not really "war" at all. Killing there may be aplenty, but it is akin to the slaughtering of animals, not war. War is a form of collective intentionality, and as such is only war if both sides *think* it is war.[61] Similarly, a balance of power in this context is not really a

[57] Waltz (1979). [58] Cf. Wolfers (1962: 26–27).

[59] By one count, the world has gone from 600,000 autonomous political units in 1000 B.C. to about 200 today; see Carneiro (1978: 213–215).

[60] Mearsheimer's (1994/1995: 42). [61] Searle (1995: 89).

"balance of power." Mechanical equilibrium there may be, but actors are not aware of it as such.

Individual human beings probably never lived in such a world because they are by nature group animals,[62] although it is not altogether unlike the situation facing infants, who have not yet acquired culture but get punished when they fail to follow its norms. States are by nature more solitary than people, however, and so in world politics systems of entirely private meanings have sometimes occurred. The archetype is the Hobbesian First Encounter, in which an aggressive state tries to conquer another, previously unknown state.[63] Huns emerging from the steppes to conquer and kill Romans, Mongols doing the same to medieval Europeans, Europeans colonizing non-Europeans, and so on are all examples of states operating in a world of private, domestically constituted meanings trying to conquer or enslave an Other.[64] The structure of these situations is still "social" in that they are based on ideas about the Other that each side takes into account, but these ideas are not shared and so do not form a culture. Neorealists would like anarchy to play an important causal role in explaining these Encounters, but in fact its role is only permissive. If the conquistadores had brought other meanings with them, like the Federation's "Prime Directive" of non-interference in the television show *Star Trek*, the results would have been quite different. There is nothing in anarchy as such that forces these situations to be Hobbesian, even if they often do take on such a structure; one can imagine Lockean and Kantian First Encounters as well.

These situations of pure private knowledge are not likely to last long. From the start of a First Encounter actors will be learning about each other and bringing their expectations into line, and they also have an incentive to communicate, if only to demand and arrange surrender. The fact that they do not recognize each other's right to life and liberty is nevertheless a powerful constraint on them ever forming a culture, since it means that they are as likely to kill the Other as share ideas with him. This constraint could be decisive for individuals, who can be killed quite easily. Because of their material nature as large organizations specializing in self-defense, however,

[62] On the implications of this point for "state of nature" theorizing see Alford (1994).

[63] See Schwartz, ed. (1994) for an introduction to First Encounters, and for discussion of their significance for IR, Inayatullah and Blaney (1996).

[64] Note that "private" and "domestic" here are relative to the target only, since many of these states formed their beliefs in states systems of their own.

states are much harder to "kill" than people and so the strict analogy to Hobbes' state of nature does not hold.[65] This resilience is relative, with weak states being vulnerable to elimination by the strong, but enemies that survive the initial clash of arms will be the tougher for it, and start forming a shared understanding of their condition, the Hobbesian culture.

In this culture states have shared knowledge of at least three things: (1) that they are dealing with other states, beings like themselves; (2) that these beings are their enemies and therefore threaten their life and liberty; and (3) how to deal with enemies – how to make war, communicate threats, arrange surrenders, balance power, and so on. What states now share, in short, are the norms of a realpolitik culture,[66] where power politics and self-help are not just behavioral regularities, as in nature, but a shared *understanding* about "how things are done." Killing is now "war": an institution, not in the sense of rules that reduce violence (in the Hobbesian case they do not), as in Bull's analysis,[67] but in the sense that everyone knows what war is and what it is about. Similarly, a mechanical equilibrium is now a "balance of power." Ironically, therefore, it is only with the emergence of a Hobbesian *culture* that "Realism" can emerge as a discourse about international politics.

This culture can be internalized to three degrees, which yield three pathways, and corresponding hypotheses, for how it may be realized: force (the traditional Realist hypothesis), price (Neoliberal or rationalist), and legitimacy (Idealist or constructivist). Although their outcomes are similar (a Hobbesian structure), their differences bear on a number of important theoretical and empirical issues: why states comply with Hobbesian culture, the quality of that compliance, its resistance to change, and ultimately the difference that it makes.

The First Degree hypothesis

When a cultural norm has been internalized only to this degree an actor knows what the norm is, but complies only because he is forced to, directly or by the threat of certain, immediate punishment that

[65] This – and the fact that Hobbes himself knew this – has been pointed out by a number of commentators; see, for example, Bull (1977: 46–51), Heller (1980), and Buzan (1991: 148–149).

[66] See Ashley (1987), who uses the term "community" rather than "culture" to make the point.

[67] Bull (1977: 184–199).

would force him. He is neither motivated to comply of his own accord, nor does he think that doing so is in his self-interest. He does it because he must, because he is coerced or compelled. His behavior is purely externally rather than internally driven – though compliance brought about by the *threat* of force adds a self-regulating element, and begins to blur the line with the Second Degree case (hence the qualifiers "certain" and "immediate" above). Given the external source of his behavior the quality of his compliance is low and requires constant pressure; remove the compulsion and he will break the norm. Even though he shares knowledge of the rules, he does not accept their implications for himself. Others are positioning him in a particular role, but he is contesting it. If he succeeds then he breaches the norm, if he fails then he is forced to comply. In this situation, in sum, it is private meanings plus material coercion rather than culture which does most of the explanatory work, which is how Realists tend to think about the difference that norms make.

This is one reason that states may conform to Hobbesian norms. It is fairly easy to see how this could happen to "nice," status quo states who would rather get along than conquer each other. A world of such states would only get into a Hobbesian situation in the first place if they mistakenly assumed the worst about each other's intentions, but uncertainty and risk-aversion could lead to just that. If so, they will feel compelled to engage in deep revisionist behavior even though they neither want to nor think it is in their self-interest, which in turn compels other states to do so as well. This is the familiar logic of the security dilemma, albeit a particularly acute one, which is a "dilemma" only because states are better off cooperating.[68] What is ultimately driving this logic is a collective representation of their condition as Hobbesian. Thus even though on one level material force is doing most of the work in explaining why these status quo states engage in realpolitik, it is coercion based on a shared idea which pushes the system in one direction, despite a distribution of interests that points in another.

Perhaps paradoxically, however, a system of revisionist, "Hitler" states may also be forced to comply with Hobbesian norms. The interest of these states is in conquering each other, at the limit in creating a world empire, and as such they are not better off cooperating. Although this distribution of interests means their

[68] Schweller (1996).

enmity is real rather than a chimera, which constitutes a very different reason for getting into the Hobbesian world than the world of nice states above (will to power rather than misperception), as long as they have internalized its culture only to the first degree Hitler states will be equally coerced by its logic. What they want is for other states to surrender, not fight back; realpolitik is not an end in itself, nor is it something they do out of self-interest. It is forced on them by the fact that other states represent them as an enemy and act accordingly.

The Westphalian system being a Lockean culture, neither of these exemplary First Degree Hobbesian situations explains much of recent Western history. What has happened instead are temporary regressions to a Hobbesian condition when a powerful state had an internal revolution and rejected Lockean norms altogether. The clearest examples are the French Revolution and subsequent Napoleonic Wars, which Bukovansky[69] argues created a (temporary) "state of nature" with the rest of Europe, and the rise of Hitler and World War II. In both cases exogenous changes in a few states led to a rejection of existing shared meanings in favor of private ones, and unlimited aggression in an effort to "share" the latter, which forced status quo states to comply with Hobbesian norms. (A similar story might be told about "rogue" or "pariah" states today.) Although in neither case would most of us admire the goals of the revisionists, at least in the Napoleonic case one could argue that forcing a Hobbesian logic on the existing dynastic system was necessary to destroy norms that had become corrupt, and as such was ultimately a basis for a historically progressive transformation of the system.

The Second Degree hypothesis

It is not easy to make a clean distinction between First and Second Degree internalization, between being forced to do something and doing it out of self-interest, especially if we allow merely the threat of force to count as coercion.[70] Yet in everyday life we are often called upon to make exactly this distinction and the result is seen as meaningful, notably in courts of law, where the conclusion that someone was coerced into a crime may exonerate them or at least reduce their sentence. Despite its difficulties, the distinction seems intuitive and important, and it is useful to make an effort to characterize it.

[69] Bukovansky (1999a).

[70] See Hurd (1999) for a nice try; cf. Krasner (1991).

The intuition turns on the idea of "choice." The First Degree case corresponds to situations in which most of us would be willing to say that actors had no choice but to follow a norm – even though it is an existential feature of the human condition that we always have *some* choice, to "just say no," even if that means certain death.[71] In the Second Degree case actors do have a meaningful choice, which implies the existence of a social or temporal space where actors are free from direct and immediate coercion. Second Degree internalization exists when actors in this space obey cultural norms not because they think the norms are legitimate (the Third Degree case), but because they think it is in their self-interest. Actors see an advantage to compliance in advancing an exogenously given interest, and as such their attitude toward the norm is instrumental, using it for their own purposes. Compared to the coercion case their compliance is more internally driven or *self-regulating*, and therefore likely to be of higher quality. Even without coercion they will tend to comply. But compared to the Third Degree case compliance is still more externally determined. Actors have no intrinsic interest in complying with norms, and to that extent still experience them as external constraints. Their compliance is "necessary," even though they benefit from it. Another way to put this is in terms of whether actors *accept* the implications of shared knowledge for themselves. In the First Degree case actors "share" culture in the sense that they "know" it, but do not accept its implications for their behavior. In the Second Degree case actors accept shared meanings and so there is now a more or less normalized culture, but the acceptance is purely instrumental. As soon as the costs of following the rules outweigh the benefits, actors should change their behavior.

At this stage of internalization actors begin to offer justifications for their behavior by reference to shared expectations.[72] In a Hobbesian culture these justifications will emphasize "necessity" and "raison d'état." Although they are not being directly coerced into practices of realpolitik and as such have the space to consider alternative courses of action, states all know that this is how the game is played and that it is only a matter of time before they are under attack again. They will therefore justify their own realpolitik practices with arguments like "everyone knows that if we had not conquered X, then Y would have,

[71] Carveth (1982: 213–215).

[72] On justifications as a guide to normative structure see especially Kratochwil (1989).

intolerably weakening our relative position," or "everyone knows that it is in war that the virtue of the nation is forged," or "everyone knows that if we had not attacked *B*, *B* would have attacked us, giving them the benefit of surprise." These arguments have meaning to other states because of shared ideas about how things are done. This is not to say that a state could not give meaning to such beliefs all by itself, just as a paranoid or schizophrenic can live in a world of private meanings, but then that is why we consider them paranoid or schizophrenic. We may hear their words and understand their literal meaning, but they are not "making sense" because they are not speaking a language we share. Similarly in a Hobbesian culture: not only do states have "Realist" beliefs, but these are justified and made intelligible by the fact that states all know they are necessary.

The shared knowledge that constitutes Lockean and Kantian cultures is to an important extent institutionalized in international law and regimes, with corresponding manifestations at the domestic level. By contrast, the violent and alienated nature of Hobbesian culture ensures that its norms are not likely to be formalized at the systemic level, and indeed its members might not even see them as norms, or themselves as forming a culture, at all. Their shared knowledge might be entirely "tacit."[73] If such a culture is institutionalized, therefore, it is likely to be at the *domestic* level only. If this domestic knowledge were purely private then we could not speak of a systemic culture, but if each member of the system operates under the same domestic constraints and at least tacitly knows this about the others, then we can speak in such terms.

As a general rule we can expect that any Hobbesian culture which has survived for more than a short time will be internalized at least to the Second Degree, since the costs to individual states of failing to accept the fact that they are in such a system could be fatal. Whether these cultures will always have Third Degree effects is less clear.

The Third Degree hypothesis

Sometimes people follow norms not because they think it will serve some exogenously given end but because they think the norms are legitimate and therefore *want* to follow them. To say that a norm is legitimate is to say that an actor fully accepts its claims on himself, which means appropriating as a subjectively held identity the role in

[73] On tacit knowledge see Pleasants (1996).

which they have been positioned by the generalized Other. In the Second Degree case actors "try on" identities that conform to role expectations but do so for only instrumental reasons, relating to them as if they were external objects. In the Third Degree case actors identify with others' expectations, relating to them as a part of themselves. The Other is now inside the cognitive boundary of the Self, constituting who it sees itself as in relation to the Other, its "Me." It is only with this degree of internalization that a norm really constructs agents; prior to this point their identities and interests are exogenous to it. Because it is constitutive of their identity, in turn, actors now have a stake in the norm that they did not before. Their behavior is interested, but not "self"-interested (chapter 5, pp. 238–243). The quality of their compliance will therefore be high, as will their resistance to normative change.

There is an apparent paradox in applying this reasoning to the Hobbesian culture which makes it a hard case for a constructivist analysis. The paradox concerns the peculiarities of the role of enemy, which dictates that an actor should try to take away the life and/or liberty of the very actors whose expectations they need to internalize to constitute their identities as enemies. How could actors have a stake in a culture the logical basis of which they are trying to destroy? What would it mean to internalize the role of enemy to this degree? On the surface the answer might seem to be for the posture of Self toward Other in enmity, deep revisionism, to become an interest rather than merely a strategy. Many states historically have had such an interest, of course, but this cannot be the answer to our question, since an interest in conquest is not the same thing as an interest in enmity, and indeed they are in some way opposed. An interest in deep revisionism is satisfied by conquest, an interest in enmity is not; deep revisionism seeks to remove the Other from the game, enmity needs the Other to constitute its identity; deep revisionism sees the Hobbesian culture as an obstacle to be overcome, enmity sees it as an end in itself. The posture toward the Other entailed by enmity, in other words, seems to vitiate internalizing a Hobbesian culture so deeply that it constitutes interests.

The solution to this problem depends on a material constraint, namely that states do not have enough power to "kill" each other. If states did have that power in a Hobbesian culture then they would exercise it, since that is what one must do to survive in such a world. Material constraints – notably, a balance of power or inadequate

military technology – can prevent this outcome. Given such a constraint, it is possible not only for enmity to be seen as necessary (the Second Degree case), but as legitimate, and with that legitimacy for states to appropriate the enemy identity as their own, with its corresponding interests. Power politics is now not just a means but an end in itself, a value constituted collectively as "right," "glorious," or "virtuous," and as a result states now *need* the Other to play the role of enemy as a site for their efforts to realize those values. What matters now is "fighting the good fight," just *trying* to destroy your enemies, not whether you succeed; indeed were you to succeed the result might be cognitive dissonance and uncertainty about who you are in the absence of your enemy – a phenomenon sometimes cited as a cause of US foreign policy drift after the Cold War.

Hobbesian culture has both causal and constitutive effects on the internalization of this identity. The causal effects concern the role that the culture plays in the production and reproduction of enemy identities over time. Causal effects presuppose that the explanans (identities and interests) exists independent of the explanandum (culture), and that interaction with the latter changes the former over time in a billiard ball, mechanistic sense. I address this side of identity formation in chapter 7. Because it assumes that Self and Other are independently existing, however, a causal orientation suggests that the resulting identities and interests are entirely actors' own, not intrinsically dependent on shared knowledge for their meaning. The constitutive effects of culture show that this is not right, that identities and interests depend conceptually or logically on culture in the sense that it is only in virtue of shared meanings that it is possible to think about who one is or what one wants in certain ways. Identity is here an effect of culture in the way that speech is an effect of language: in each case it is the structure of the latter, the grammar, that makes the former possible. The relation is one of logical necessity, not causal contingency, an internal rather than external relation. To say that a state has fully internalized a Hobbesian culture in this constitutive sense, therefore, is not to say that it has been affected in billiard ball fashion by something external to it, but that it is carrying the culture around in its "head," defining who it is, what it wants, and how it thinks. In the rest of this section I want to flesh this proposition out.

There are at least three ways in which states may need each other to be enemies, all of which might be considered forms of "adversary

symbiosis."[74] Two are well known, but none to my knowledge has been used to argue that enemy identities are constituted by the culture of the international system. In each case the enemy has to have enough material power to avoid getting killed too easily, but the rest of the logic is thoroughly social.

The most conventional argument about adversary symbiosis concerns the military–industrial complex. Over time, interaction in a Hobbesian system tends to create domestic interest groups who profit from the arms race and therefore lobby national decision-makers not to reduce arms spending. Insofar as this lobbying is successful, these groups will help constitute a state identity that depends for its existence on an enemy Other. Some have suggested, for example, that the US and Soviet militaries had a common interest in sustaining the Cold War because of the benefits it generated for each. These benefits were greatest when the Other could be portrayed as an existential threat, and as such constituted an interest not only in exaggerating the perceived threat posed by the Other, but in acting in aggressive ways which exacerbated its reality. By projecting and acting on an expectation that the Other was supposed to be an enemy, each was encouraging him to take on that identity so that the Self could in turn maintain its own identity. To that extent the militaristic identity of each depended logically, not just causally, on meanings shared with an enemy-Other.

The second argument concerns "in-group solidarity," which concerns the role of enemies in enabling states to meet their national interests. In recent IR scholarship this argument has been made most interestingly, though in different forms, by Campbell[75] and Mercer.[76]

Working out of a postmodernist perspective, Campbell argues that the American state depends on a "discourse of danger" in which state elites periodically invent or exaggerate threats to the body politic in order to produce and sustain an "us" in distinction to "them," and thereby justify the existence of their state. On one level this hypothesis taps some of the same cultural mechanisms as the familiar "rally round the flag" phenomenon underlying the "diversionary theory of war," according to which weak governments divert internal dissent by engaging in external aggression.[77] What Campbell adds is the hypothesis that discourses of danger produce the distinction between

[74] Stein (1982). [75] Campbell (1992). [76] Mercer (1995).
[77] Levy (1988).

"internal" and "external" in the first place and as such constitute the whole idea of a distinct group on which the state's corporate identity depends. States' dependence on discourses of danger would seem to be a matter of degree, with the US perhaps at the high end of the spectrum, but state security always depends on an on-going process of differentiating Self from the Other, and it is reasonable to think that this process sometimes takes Hobbesian forms. In those cases who states are and what they want would depend on meanings shared with an enemy-Other.

In contrast to Campbell's focus on states' physical security needs, Mercer focuses on their self-esteem needs, but he too is dealing with the problem of in-group solidarity. As we saw in chapter 5, Mercer uses social identity theory to argue that like the members of any human group, the members of states tend to compare their group favorably to other states in order to enhance their self-esteem, and that this predisposes states to define their interests in egoistic terms. It is important to emphasize that this "in-group bias" does not in itself imply aggression or enmity,[78] but it does provide a cognitive resource for such behavior. If a shared understanding exists that this is how states are going to constitute each other, in turn, then states may find that enmity has value in itself, since by mobilizing in-group/out-group dynamics it can significantly bolster group self-esteem.

The third mechanism by which Hobbesian cultures may constitute interests, projective identification, is not generally recognized in IR scholarship and I offer it more tentatively than the others. In part this is because it comes out of psychoanalytic theory, specifically Melanie Klein's work on "object relations," about which some social scientists may be skeptical, and in part because of the difficulty of applying it to groups. However, there is today a growing body of psychoanalytic work on social theory in general,[79] and, led by Vamik Volkan and C. Fred Alford, on inter-group and international relations in particular,[80] and so it seems useful to consider its relevance to the story.

The projective identification thesis emphasizes the enemy's role as a site for displacing unwanted feelings about the Self. According to this

[78] Struch and Schwartz (1989).

[79] See, for example, Carveth (1982), Golding (1982), Alford (1989), and Kaye (1991).

[80] Volkan (1988), Alford (1994). See Moses (1982), Bloom (1990), Kristeva (1993), Cash (1996), and Sucharov (2000). Interestingly, Kaplan's (1957: 253–270) classic includes an appendix applying psychoanalytic ideas to the international system. (I thank Mike Barnett for bringing this to my attention.)

idea, individuals who, because of personal pathologies, cannot control potentially destructive unconscious fantasies, like feelings of rage, aggression, or self-hatred, will sometimes attribute or "project" them on to an Other, and then through their behavior pressure that Other to "identify" with or "act out" those feelings so that the Self can then control or destroy them by controlling or destroying the Other.[81] As in social identity theory this serves a self-esteem function, but here self-esteem needs are met not simply by making favorable comparisons with an Other but by trying to destroy him. A requirement of this process is therefore "splitting" the Self into "good" and "bad" elements, with the latter being projected on to the Other. Howard Stein saw such a process at work in the US during the Cold War: "[w]e do not relate to the Soviet Union as though it were separate, distinct, from ourselves; rather we act toward it as though it were an unruly, unacceptable part or aspect of ourselves."[82] This can in turn be a basis for the cultural constitution of enmity, since the split Self needs the Other to identify with its ejected elements, to collude with the Self, in order to justify destroying them via the Other. At first the Other might not cooperate or identify with this desire, in which case we would be dealing with chimerical enemy images like those that animated the Nazis, rather than a shared culture. If the Other projects *its* unwanted elements on to the Self, however, then each will be able to play the role the other needs, and their shared (if tacit or unconscious) knowledge to this effect will make their revisionist desires meaningful. Each will have a stake in the enemy-Other because it enables them to try to control or destroy parts of themselves to which they are hostile.

Even if this argument is accepted at the level of individuals, when applied to states it raises hard questions of anthropomorphism, operationalization, and falsification that I cannot address here. My point in floating it is not to assert its truth but to illustrate one more way in which a Hobbesian culture might constitute interests, and to remind us, *inter alia*, that human motivation may be more complicated than the usual assumption in IR of rational egoism. Moreover, it seems to capture certain features of "intractable conflicts"[83] in international politics that are less obviously accounted for by other explanations: chimerical enemies, irrational hatred, the inability to

[81] See Alford (1994: 48–56) for a good overview.
[82] Stein (1985: 250).
[83] Kriesberg, *et al.*, eds. (1989).

recognize the role that one's own aggression plays in conflict, and the enthusiasm with which people may go to war, suggesting a cathartic release of pent-up aggression or rage. All have quite natural explanations if what is going on in trying to kill the Other is killing part of the Self. The role that unconscious processes play in international politics is something that needs to be considered more systematically, not dismissed out of hand.

These three hypotheses all suggest ways in which the norms of the Hobbesian culture may constitute an interest in enmity, rather than merely regulating the behavior of actors whose enmity is constituted exogenously. Enmity here is constituted top–down, not bottom–up. Paradoxically, therefore, despite the greater depth of their polarization the relationship between enemies in this Third Degree case is more "intimate" than it is in less fully internalized Hobbesian cultures.[84] Having defined their identities and interests in terms of a shared systemic culture, enemies have become a group – albeit a dysfunctional one that has suppressed any sense of itself. Characterizing Hobbes' state of nature, Alford uses the psychoanalytic concept of a "regressed group" to describe this condition:

> The group seems like a bunch of autonomous individuals, but only because the members are in such a state of dedifferentiation that all they can know of the other is that he is other, his otherness constituting the threat that dedifferentiation defends against. Not as autonomy but as isolation is how individuality is experienced in the regressed group.[85]

This, I would suggest, is the ultimate deep structure of the Hobbesian world, not the Realist's combination of human nature plus anarchy.

This matters in the end for the possibility of change. It is often assumed that Realism's materialist approach inevitably leads to an emphasis on the impossibility of structural change under anarchy, and that an idealist approach must emphasize the plasticity of structure. In my view the opposite is true. The more deeply that a structure of shared ideas penetrates actors' identities and interests the more resistant to change it will be. No structure is easy to change, but a Hobbesian culture that constructs states as enemies will be a lot more resilient than one in which shared ideas matter as little as Realists say.

[84] On identity in intimate relationships see Blumstein (1991).
[85] Alford (1994: 87).

The Lockean culture

It is an interesting question how much of international history fits the Hobbesian mold. Judging from the violence and high death rate of states in the past it seems clear that world politics has *often* been Hobbesian, and some Realists might argue that it has always been so. It would make sense for enmity to dominate international history if new states systems are prone to starting out that way, since cultures are self-fulfilling prophecies which are resistant to change. This makes the modern, Westphalian states system all the more surprising, however, since it clearly is not Hobbesian. The death rate of states is almost nil; small states are thriving; inter-state war is rare and normally limited; territorial boundaries have "hardened";[86] and so on. Realists tend not to attach much significance to such changes,[87] and focus on continuities instead: wars still happen, power still matters. Yet to my mind the empirical record suggests strongly that in the past few centuries there has been a qualitative structural change in international politics. The kill or be killed logic of the Hobbesian state of nature has been replaced by the live and let live logic of the Lockean anarchical society.[88] In chapter 7 I explore one way of thinking about the causes of this change. Here I focus just on how the Lockean ideal type is constituted, and suggest that it is not as much a self-help system as we often assume.

Rivalry

The Lockean culture has a different logic from the Hobbesian because it is based on a different role structure, rivalry rather than enmity. Like enemies, rivals are constituted by representations about Self and Other with respect to violence, but these representations are less threatening: unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they recognize their sovereignty, their "life and liberty," as a *right*, and therefore not to try to conquer or dominate them. Since state sovereignty is territorial, in turn, this implies recognition of a right to some "property" as well. Unlike friends, however, the recognition among rivals does not extend to the right to be free from violence in disputes.

[86] Smith (1981).

[87] Buzan's (1991) distinction between "immature" and "mature" anarchies is an important exception.

[88] Bull (1977). On Locke's view of anarchy see Simmons (1989).

Moreover, some of these disputes may concern boundaries, and so rivalry could involve some territorial revisionism. The right to some property – enough to "live" – is acknowledged, but which property may be disputed, sometimes by force.

Underlying rivalry is a right to sovereignty.[89] In chapter 5 I argued that sovereignty is an intrinsic property of the states, like being six feet tall, and as such it exists even when there are no other states. This property becomes a "right" only when other states recognize it. Rights are social capacities that are conferred on actors by others' "permission" to do certain things.[90] A powerful state may have the material capability to defend its sovereignty against all comers, but even without that ability a weak state can enjoy its sovereignty if other states recognize it as a right. The reason for this is that a constitutive feature of having a right is self-limitation by the Other, his acceptance of the Self's enjoyment of certain powers. I take this to be implicit in what IR scholars call being "status quo" toward other states. The status quo may be enforced in the last instance by coercion, but as even Hobbes recognized a society based solely on force would not last long. Whether out of self-interest or the perceived legitimacy of its norms, the members of a well-functioning society must also restrain *themselves*. For Hobbes the role of the state was to institutionalize such self-restraint, not be a complete substitute for it.[91] Having a right depends on others' restraint, on being treated by them as an end in yourself rather than as merely an object to be disposed of as they see fit. Absent such restraint rights are nothing more than whatever a person can get away with, which is to say not "rights" at all.

When states recognize each other's sovereignty as a right then we can speak of sovereignty not only as a property of individual states, but as an *institution* shared by many states. The core of this institution is the shared expectation that states will not try to take away each other's life and liberty. In the Westphalian system this belief is formalized in international law, which means that far from being merely an epiphenomenon of material forces, international law is actually a key part of the deep structure of contemporary international politics.[92] Despite the absence of centralized enforcement, almost all

[89] On sovereignty as a right see Ruggie (1983a), Fain (1987), Baldwin (1992), Kratochwil (1995), and Reus-Smit (1997).

[90] Fain (1987: 134–160). [91] Hanson (1984).

[92] Kocs (1994); see also Coplin (1965) and Slaughter (1995).

states today adhere to this law almost all of the time,[93] and it is increasingly considered binding (and therefore enforceable) even on states that have not agreed to its provisions.[94] Modern inter-state rivalry, in other words, is constrained by the structure of sovereign rights recognized by international law, and to that extent is based on the rule of law. Within that constraint, however, rivalry is compatible with the use of force to settle disputes, and as such the Lockean culture is not a complete rule of law system. What this comes down to in the end is the level of violence that states expect of each other. Rivals expect Others to use violence sometimes to settle disputes, but to do so within "live and let live" limits.

Realists might point out that states can never be "100 percent certain" about each other's intentions because they cannot read each other's minds or be sure they will not change,[95] and from this argue that since in an anarchy the costs of a mistake can be fatal states have no choice but to represent each other as enemies. This reasoning makes sense in a Hobbesian culture, but it is hard to see its force today, when almost all states *know* that almost all other states recognize their sovereignty. This knowledge is not 100 percent certain, but *no* knowledge is that. The question is whether states' knowledge about each other's intentions is sufficiently uncertain to warrant worst-case assumptions, and in most cases today the answer is no. This is precisely what one would expect in a culture based on the institution of sovereignty, which enables states to make reliable inferences about each other's status quoness even without access to their "minds." One could argue that policy-makers' complacency is irrational, that because of anarchy they *should* treat each other as enemies, but that actually seems far more irrational than acting on the basis of the vast experience which suggests otherwise. It would be crazy today for Norway and Sweden, Kenya and Tanzania, or almost any other dyad in the international system to represent each other as enemies; rivals perhaps, but not enemies. The exceptions (North and South Korea; Israeli and Palestinian radicals) highlight just how unusual enmity is today. Moreover, despite their Hobbesian inclinations this fact is not lost on most Realists. Waltz's assumption that states seek security rather than power would make little sense if states really did think that others were trying to conquer them. Anarchy may

[93] Henkin (1979: 47). [94] Charney (1993). [95] Mearsheimer (1994/1995: 10).

make the achievement of rivalry difficult, but even most Realists seem to think it is possible.

The implications of rivalry for the Self are less clear than they are of enmity because the Other's perceived restraint gives a state a choice. If the Other is an enemy then a state has little choice but to respond in kind. Not so with rivalry. Some states may consider an Other willing to restrain itself a "sucker," and respond by trying to "kill" it, as exemplified perhaps by Hitler's reaction to the Munich agreement. In this case there is an asymmetry in roles (one side sees rivalry, the other enmity), and the result will be a quick descent into a Hobbesian world. The ever-present possibility of such a descent is what motivates Realist "worst-caseism," but this does not happen very often in the modern world because other states' recognition of its sovereignty gives a state space to make another choice – to reciprocate. If it does then states enter the logic of rivalry.

Rivalry has at least four implications for foreign policy. The most important is that whatever conflicts they may have, states must behave in a status quo fashion toward each other's sovereignty. The second implication concerns the nature of rational behavior. Whereas enemies have to make decisions on the basis of high risk-aversion, short time horizons, and relative power, rivalry permits a more relaxed view. The institution of sovereignty makes security less "scarce," so risks are fewer, the future matters more, and absolute gains may override relative losses. If prospect theory defines rational behavior for enemies, then expected-utility theory does for rivals. This does not mean that states no longer worry about security, but their anxiety is less intense because certain pathways on the "game tree" – those involving their own "death" – have been removed. Third, relative military power is still important because rivals know that others might use force to settle disputes, but its meaning is different than it is for enemies because the institution of sovereignty changes the "balance of threat."[96] In the Hobbesian world military power dominates all decision-making, whereas in the Lockean it is less of a priority. Threats are not existential, and allies can be more easily trusted when one's own power is insufficient. Finally, if disputes do go to war, rivals will limit their own violence. In the Westphalian system these limits are expressed in Just War Theory and standards of civilization, which lays down the conditions under and extent to

[96] Walt (1987).

which states may use violence against each other. There is growing empirical evidence that these norms cause states to restrain themselves in modern warfare.[97] Enemies and rivals may be equally prone to violence, but a small difference in roles makes a big difference in its degree.

The logic of Lockean anarchy

So far I have talked about rivalry as an inter-psychological relationship, as a conjoining of subjective beliefs about the Self and the Other. If these beliefs change then so does the rivalry. It is important to acknowledge this level in the structure of rivalry because subjective perceptions are a micro-foundation for cultural forms. However, there is another, macro-, level in the organization of rivalry, in which "rival" is a preexisting position in a stock of shared knowledge that supervenes on the ideas of individual states. This is rivalry as a *collective* representation. Once rivalry acquires this status states will make attributions about each other's "minds" based more on what they know about the structure than what they know about each other, and the system will acquire a logic of its own. Practices of rivalry sustain this logic, such that if their frequency falls below the tipping point it will change, but until then the system will have a macro-structure that can be multiply realized at the micro-level. This structure, Bull's "anarchical society," generates four tendencies.

The first is that warfare is simultaneously accepted and constrained. On the one hand, states reserve and periodically exercise the right to use violence to advance their interests. War is accepted as normal and legitimate,[98] and could be just as common as in the Hobbesian anarchy. On the other hand, wars tend to be limited, not in the sense of not killing a lot of people, but of not killing *states*. Wars of conquest are rare, and when they do occur other states tend to act collectively to restore the status quo (World War II, Korean War, the Gulf War). This suggests that the standard definition of war in IR scholarship as "a conflict producing at least 1000 battle deaths" conflates two different social kinds, what Ruggie calls "constitutive" wars and "configurative" wars.[99] In constitutive wars, which dominate Hobbesian anar-

[97] See, for example, Ray (1989), Nadelmann (1990), Price (1995), and Tannenwald (1999).
[98] See Jochnick and Normand (1994).
[99] Ruggie (1993: 162–163). Ruggie makes a further distinction between configurative and positional wars.

chies, the type and existence of units is at stake; in configurative wars, which dominate Lockean anarchies, the units are accepted by the parties, who are fighting over territory and strategic advantage instead. The causes, dynamics, and outcomes of the two kinds of war should vary, and as such they should not be treated as one dependent variable.

Limited warfare underpins a second tendency, which is for the system to have a relatively stable membership or low death rate over time. Membership is key, since this tendency does not apply to states whose sovereignty is not recognized by the system, like the indigenous states of the Americas before the Conquest. Indeed, placing the fate of these unrecognized states next to that of recognized ones provides some of the strongest evidence for a structural difference between Lockean and Hobbesian anarchies. As David Strang[100] shows, since 1415 states recognized as sovereign by European states have a much higher survival rate than those that were not. In the modern era "micro" states like Singapore and Monaco – much weaker in relative terms than the Aztecs or Incas – are flourishing, and even "failed" states that lack empirical sovereignty manage to persist because international society recognizes their juridical sovereignty.[101] In all of these cases states survived for social not material reasons, because potential predators *let* them live. This indicates a world in which the weak are protected by the restraint of the strong, not a survival of the fittest.

A third tendency is for states to balance power. Waltz sees this as an effect of anarchy as such, but the argument here suggests that balancing is actually more of an effect of the mutual recognition of sovereignty. In the Hobbesian anarchy states balance if they must, but the lack of mutual recognition and resulting pressure to maximize power gives balancing a "knife's edge" quality, enabling a tendency toward concentrating power to dominate. If states think that others recognize their sovereignty, however, then survival is not at stake if their relative power falls, and the pressure to maximize power is much less. The institution of sovereignty in effect "arrests" the Hobbesian tendency toward concentration. In this situation balancing can paradoxically become a relatively stable source of order with respect to the many *non*-existential issues that may remain sources of violent conflict. This is not to deny that balancing

[100] Strang (1991). [101] Jackson and Rosberg (1982).

also provides insurance against loss of sovereignty, which an unbalanced distribution of power in principle threatens, but in Lockean systems most states most of the time do not in fact need (nor do they have) this insurance because recognition makes it unnecessary.[102] It is precisely because balancing is *not* essential for survival, in other words, that it becomes a basis for order in the first place.

A final tendency is that neutrality or non-alignment becomes a recognized status. If states can resolve their differences then there is no necessity for them to compete militarily at all, since there is no longer a threat of revisionism. It may be difficult to achieve such a condition as long as states are prone to violence and security dilemmas, but assuming that conflicts can be resolved mutual indifference is a stable outcome in a live and let live system.

These tendencies suggest that the anarchy portrayed by Waltz is actually a Lockean rather than Hobbesian system. His analogy to markets, which presuppose institutions that ensure that actors do not kill each other,[103] his emphasis on balancing, his observation that modern states have a low death rate, and his assumption that states are security- rather than power-seeking are all things associated with the relatively self-restrained Lockean culture, not the war of all against all. In one sense this is not surprising, since Waltz's main concern, the Westphalian system, *is* a Lockean culture. Unfortunately, Waltz does not address the possibility that this culture has a different logic than the Hobbesian one with which Realism is often associated, nor the underlying social relations that generate this logic in the first place. This allows Neorealists to trade on the tough, hard-nosed rhetoric of "Realism" while presupposing the kinder, gentler world described by their critics. A Lockean culture, in short, is a condition of possibility for the truth of Neorealism.

Internalization and the Foucault effect

The institution of sovereignty is the basis of the contemporary international system. There have always been exceptions to its norms, which raise hard questions about the extent to which the system is

[102] On the role of mutual recognition as a basis for social order see Pizzorno (1991).

[103] See Nau (1994) for a good discussion of the ways in which the market analogy poses problems for Waltz's account.

Lockean,[104] but nevertheless almost all states today obey those norms almost all of the time, which poses even harder questions to any other interpretation of the system. In this section I consider how this widespread compliance should be explained. The three possibilities – coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy – reflect the three degrees to which sovereignty norms can be internalized. Different degrees may apply to different states, but taken in the aggregate they constitute three pathways by which a Lockean culture can be realized, and thus three answers to the question, "what difference does sovereignty make to the international system?" The answer to this question matters for explaining how rivalry works, and for predicting its stability. After briefly reviewing the First and Second Degree arguments I concentrate on the Third, and especially its constitutive aspects, which I suggest can be described together as a "Foucault Effect"[105] – the social constitution of "possessive individuals."

The First Degree, Realist explanation for the Lockean culture holds when states comply with sovereignty norms because they are forced to by the superior power of others. This power might be exercised directly, like the Allied Coalition's roll-back of Iraq's conquest of Kuwait, or indirectly, as in situations where the balance of power, dominance of defensive technology, or other material conditions make the costs of attempting conquest too high.[106] In either case, in order for coercion to explain compliance it must be the case that states neither want to comply of their own accord nor see it as in their self-interest. It must be against their will, which in effect means that they must have revisionist interests toward others' sovereignty. If this were not the case then while it may still be true that some states lack the material power to take away others' sovereignty, this would not explain their status quo behavior, since they do not want to change it in the first place. One cannot be coerced into not doing something one does not want to do.

Sometimes coercion is the explanation for compliance with sovereignty norms. Napoleon, Hitler, and Saddam Hussein would all have revised the life and liberty of other states had they not been prevented by superior power. In cases like these material forces do more explanatory work than shared ideas, since although "shared" in the

[104] See especially Krasner (1993, 1995/6). On the significance of exceptions to rules see Edgerton (1985).

[105] Burchell, *et al.*, eds. (1991).

[106] See Powell (1991), Liberman (1993).

sense of "commonly known," the institution of sovereignty is not shared in the sense of "accepted" by revisionist states. If this were true of most states in the system then a Lockean culture would quickly degenerate into a Hobbesian. Thus, even though the coercion explanation for compliance with sovereignty norms makes sense in the breach, it is ill-equipped to account for the long term stability of Lockean cultures, which depends on a critical mass of powerful states – enough to prevent the system from tipping into another logic – *not* trying to revise each other's sovereignty. The durability of the modern, Westphalian culture suggests that it has been internalized more deeply than Realism would predict.

The Second Degree, Neoliberal or rationalist, explanation holds when states comply with sovereignty norms because they think it will advance some exogenously given interest, like security or trade. As Barry Weingast[107] shows, sovereignty can be seen as a "focal point" or salient outcome around which expectations naturally converge, which reduces uncertainty in the face of multiple equilibria and enables states to coordinate their actions on mutually beneficial outcomes. In this way the institution of sovereignty exerts a causal or regulative effect on states, which is the usual focus of individualist analyses of institutions. One of the nice features of Weingast's article, however, is that it also reveals constitutive effects, at least on behavior (as opposed to identities and interests), namely the role that shared beliefs about what *counts* as a violation of sovereignty play in enabling the institution to work. In Europe before The Peace of Augsburg in 1555 trying to force another state to be Catholic counted as a legitimate action, and may have been applauded by other states for stamping out heresy. After that the identical physical behavior counted as a violation of a prince's right to determine the religion of his own subjects, and would have been deplored. It is such constitutive effects that make the causal effects of norms possible. Whether causal or constitutive, however, culture matters much more here than in the First Degree case, but still as an intervening variable between power and interest and outcomes.[108]

As with coercion, it is important to define the self-interest explanation narrowly enough that it does not become trivial. On the one hand, to say that states comply with sovereignty for self-interested reasons presupposes that they have enough social space for this to be

[107] Weingast (1995). [108] Krasner (1983a).

a choice, so that their respect for others' sovereignty is due in part to a self-restraint which is missing in the coercion case. The institution is now achieving effects on states in part from the inside out, which is what internalization is all about. On the other hand, to count as self-interested the choice must still be made for consequentialist reasons, because the benefits for other interests outweigh the costs, and since these incentives are shaped by how other states are expected to react, to *that* extent the choice is still determined by the external situation. Norm violation remains a live option on the decision tree, and states are engaged in on-going calculations about whether choosing it would be in their interest. The institution of sovereignty is just one more object in the environment that distributes costs and benefits, so that whenever the cost–benefit ratio indicates that breaking its rules will bring a net benefit that is what states will do.[109] What this instrumental attitude rules out is obeying sovereignty norms because they are valued for their own sake. States are status quo toward each other's sovereignty not because they are status quo states, but because this serves some other purpose; status quoness is a strategy, not an interest. Indeed, the self-interest explanation seems to preclude any interest, status quo or revisionist, toward sovereignty itself. Revisionist interests are out because then compliance would be due to coercion, and status quo interests are out because then states would value the norms themselves. Self-interested states are *indifferent* to sovereignty norms, in other words, not in the sense that they do not care if such norms exist (they do, since this helps them advance other interests), but in the sense that they do not care, one way or the other, about the norms as such.

This brings us to the Third Degree or constructivist hypothesis. Instrumentalism may be the attitude when states first settle on sovereignty norms, and continue to be for poorly socialized states down the road. People are the same way. We obey the law initially because we are forced to or calculate that it is in our self-interest. Some people never get beyond that point, but this is not true for most of us, who obey the law because we accept its claims on us as legitimate.[110] Implicit in this legitimacy are identities as law-abiding citizens which lead us to define our interests in terms of the law's "interest." External norms have become a voice in our heads telling us that we *want* to follow them. The distinction between "interest" and

[109] See Krasner (1993, 1995/6). [110] Tyler (1990); also see Hurd (1999).

"self"-interest is important here: our behavior is still "interested," in the sense that we are motivated to obey the law, but we do not treat the law as merely an object to be used for our own benefit. The costs and benefits of breaking the law do not figure in our choices because we have removed that option from our decision tree. The same thing happens in the fully internalized Lockean culture. Most states comply with its norms because they accept them as legitimate, because they identify with them and want to comply.[111] States are status quo not just at the level of behavior, but of interests as well, and as such are now more fully self-regulating actors.

As an example consider the question of why the US does not conquer the Bahamas. Coercion does not seem to be the answer, since probably no state could prevent the US from taking them, nor is there any evidence that the US has a revisionist desire to do so in the first place. The self-interest argument initially seems to do better: US policymakers might calculate that conquest would not pay because of the damage it would do to the US reputation as a law-abiding citizen, and because the US can achieve most of the benefits of conquest through economic dominance anyway. Both of these assumptions about the cost–benefit ratio are probably true, but there are two reasons to doubt that they explain US inaction. First, it is doubtful that US policymakers are making or even ever did make such calculations. It may be that respecting Bahamian sovereignty is in the self-interest of the US, but if this does not figure in its thinking then in what sense does it "explain" its behavior? Second, the definition of what counts as "paying" is shot through with cultural content. A state whose main goal was national or religious glory might not care very much about economic benefits or a reputation as law-abiding, and therefore define costs and benefits quite differently. Conquest "paid" for Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan,[112] at least initially, and the US was certainly willing to "pay" to conquer the Native Americans. Why would similar reasoning not apply to the Bahamas? The answer seems to be that the US has a status quo interest toward the Bahamas, but in order for this to be satisfying we also need to ask *why* it has this interest. My proposal is that it stems from having internalized sovereignty norms so deeply that the US defines its interests in terms of the norms, and regulates its own behavior accordingly. The US

[111] See Coplin (1965), Franck (1990), Kocs (1994), Koh (1997), and Hurd (1999).
[112] Liberman (1993).

perceives the norms as legitimate and therefore the Bahamas, as a party to those norms, has a right to life and liberty that the US would not even think of violating.

It seems to me that in the late twentieth century this is why most states follow international law. It also seems that most mainstream IR scholars, Neorealist and Neoliberal alike, must believe it as well, at least implicitly, since their work almost always assumes that the distribution of interests with respect to sovereignty is heavily biased toward the status quo. What the Bahamas Problem suggests, in other words, is that theories purporting to explain contemporary international politics solely by reference to coercion or self-interest in fact presuppose the legitimacy effects of the Lockean culture. That culture has become part of the background knowledge in terms of which modern states define their national interests.

I now want to argue that this tendency to take the culture's deepest effects for granted goes deeper, to the kinds of actors that get to have interests at all. Exogenously given in most rationalist models of international politics are four assumptions about the nature of state "individuals." These assumptions are generally good ones and I shall not dispute them. What I shall argue, rather, is that they are good because they are effects of a Lockean culture so deeply internalized today that we almost forget it is there. What I shall try to do, in other words, is endogenize rationalist assumptions about international politics to their cultural conditions of possibility.

The four constitutive effects I have in mind can be seen as aspects of a "Foucault Effect," the thesis that the self-regulating, possessive individual is an effect of a particular discourse or culture.[113] If the partly essentialist view of identity defended in chapter 5 is correct then this thesis cannot be taken too literally.[114] In the literal sense people are individuals in virtue of self-organizing biological structures that do not presuppose social relations. Although their internal structures are social rather than biological, the same principle applies to states. In both cases self-organization creates pre-social material individuals with intrinsic needs and dispositions. However, the Foucault Effect is not about the constitution of material individuality,

[113] In various forms this theory of individuation is found throughout holist social theory, back at least to Hegel. I use Foucault's name because his version (see especially 1979) is well known today (see also Pizzorno, 1991); the phrase 'Foucault Effect' is due to Burchell, *et al.*, eds. (1991).

[114] See Kitzinger (1992).

but about its meaning, the *terms* of individuality, not individuality per se. It is only in certain cultures that people are treated as intentional agents with identities, interests, and responsibility, the capacities most of us today associate with being an individual or person. The fact that human beings have these capacities naturally does not always mean they have them *socially*, and this matters for their life chances. Slaves, women, and racial "inferiors" were often held to different standards of conduct because they were not considered fully human, and so on. Conversely, the fact that animals do not seem to have such capacities naturally has not always prevented them from having them socially, as evidenced by the fact that in medieval Europe animals were often tried in courts of law and ex-communicated by the Church.[115] The hypothesis of the Foucault Effect, then, is that when moderns conceptualize and treat each other as "individuals," they are drawing on a particular, essentially liberal[116] discourse about what their bodies mean. This discourse makes material into social individuality, creating what we today understand as "rational actors," and, by extension, the possibility of theories that presuppose such creatures.

The Lockean culture individualizes states in a similar manner, although I shall argue that in doing so it paradoxically creates capacities for "other-help"[117] that the conventional, self-help assumption fails to see. The culture affects all four kinds of identities that the "individuals" of international politics can have – corporate, type, collective, and role (chapter 5). In what follows I describe these identity effects using the example of the Westphalian system. This example will affect the specifics of my narrative, but not its general structure.

The first individualizing effect of the Lockean culture is defining the criteria for membership in the system, which determines what kinds of "individuals" have standing and are therefore part of the distribution of interests. As we all know in the Westphalian system it is only states that have such standing; other kinds of individuals, whether biological or corporate, may increasingly be getting it, but this challenges the original constitution of this culture and will continue to be a long, hard fight. The dominance of states in the Westphalian system might be due to inherent competitive advantages in an anarchic world, in which case systemic culture would have little to do with it. However, as Hendrik Spruyt shows, it seems due more importantly to the fact that states recognized each other as the only

[115] Evans (1987). [116] Pizzorno (1992). [117] Mercer (1995).

kind of actor with standing, a fact which they eventually institutionalized by making empirical sovereignty the criterion for entry into international society.[118] Actors that fail this test are not recognized by the international system as "individuals," which makes it much more difficult for their interests to be realized. In this light the institution of sovereignty can be seen as a "structure of closure," exerting structural power that keeps certain kinds of players out of the game of international politics.[119] Interestingly, despite its much less forgiving character the Hobbesian culture is one in which any kind of individual can play, since there are no rules giving certain actors standing and others not. The Lockean culture pays for its relative tranquility with a less open membership policy.

On the surface this seems to be the ultimate self-help policy, since it suggests that the only way for actors to get recognized as members of the system is to *force* their way in, there being no other way to achieve exclusive authority over a territory but to expel other states. But the reality seems more complicated. Many states were only able to "exclude" others because more powerful states did not try to prevent their exclusion. In these cases empirical sovereignty seems to presuppose at least tacit recognition of juridical sovereignty rather than the other way around. This reversal of the official procedure is most obvious for failed states in Africa,[120] but it is true of many other Small Powers as well, who were only able to exclude Great Powers because the latter did not resist. The "self-help" here, in other words, is one that depends on the restraint of the powerful, which amounts to a passive form of "other-help." That might still be self-help in an interesting sense, but not in the ultimate sense of *sauve qui peut.*

This calls attention to the second constitutive effect of the Lockean culture, which is determining what kinds of *type* identities get recognized as individuals. To become a member of the Westphalian system it has never been enough merely to have the corporate identity of a state; within that category it has always been necessary also to conform to type identity criteria which define only certain *forms* of state as legitimate.[121] Historically these criteria were expressed in the "standard of civilization," a set of systemic norms requiring that states' political authority be organized domestically in a certain way,

[118] Spruyt (1994).
[119] Murphy (1984).; cf. Guzzini (1993), Onuf and Klink (1989).
[120] Jackson and Rosberg (1982).
[121] Bukovansky (1999a, b).

namely like the hierarchical, bureaucratic, and (initially) Christian and monarchical authority of European states.[122] In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries many non-European polities were empirically sovereign, but because they did not organize their authority in this manner they were not considered civilized – and therefore to have sovereign rights. Norms of what counts as a legitimate type identity have since changed. It is no longer necessary for a state to be Christian or monarchical; now it is being a "nation-"state,[123] having the institutions of a "modern" state,[124] refraining from genocide, and, increasingly, being a "capitalist" and "democratic" state. In all these respects being part of Westphalian culture is not just a matter of a state's physical individuality, but of conforming the internal structure of this individuality to external norms about its proper form. As with other type identities, like being "left-handed," this internal structure is rooted in intrinsic features of material actors and as such is constitutionally exogenous to the international system (a state can be democratic all by itself), but its social meaning and consequences are *en*dogenous.

The third way in which Lockean culture constitutes states as individuals relates to their collective or social identities. In their interactions within the Lockean culture states tend to be self-interested, but this is not true when it comes to the Lockean culture itself. Part of what it means to fully internalize a culture is that actors identify with it and therefore feel a sense of loyalty and obligation to the group which the culture defines. The peculiar nature of the Lockean culture is such that states are individualized within this group, but because the culture also constitutes their identities relative to non-members – as "civilized" states, for example – they will have a stake or interest in the group which they would not have if its norms were less fully internalized. This social identity matters because it facilitates collective action against outsiders; when the group is threatened, its members will see themselves as a "we" that needs to act collectively, as a team, in its defense. What the fully internalized Lockean culture does, in other words, is give its members an expanded sense of Self that includes the group, and this group consciousness in turn creates a rudimentary capacity for other-help, not just in the passive sense of self-restraint but in the active sense of

[122] Gong (1984), Neumann and Welsh (1991).
[123] Barkin and Cronin (1994), Hall (1999).
[124] McNeely (1995), Meyer, *et al.* (1997).

being willing to come to each other's aid. This capacity is only rudimentary, however, because of the limited norms of the Lockean culture. It is only when the actual survival of members is threatened by outsiders, by rogue states, for example, that Lockean states' collective identity will become manifest. For fights within the group states are on their own.

This relates to the final effect of the Lockean culture, which is in a sense to obscure the preceding three effects and constitute states as "possessive" individuals instead. I take this to be an effect on states' role identities, and is a key basis for rivalry. According to C.B. MacPherson, possessive individualism is a distinctive feature of the *liberal* view of the individual.

> Its possessive quality is found in its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them. The individual was seen neither as a moral whole, nor as a part of a larger social whole, but as an owner of himself. The relation of ownership, having become for more and more men the critical important relation determining their actual freedom and actual prospect of realising their full potentialities, was read back into the nature of the individual.[125]

Liberalism "desocializes" the individual, in other words, drawing a veil over his inherently social qualities and treating them as purely individual possessions instead. A consequence is that it becomes much more difficult to see why people should have any responsibility for each other's welfare, and thus to engage in collective action within the group. If people do not depend on each other for their identities then each is "his own man" and by implication owes nothing to his fellows except perhaps to leave them alone. Self-interest is thereby constituted as the appropriate relationship of Self to Other, which in effect *creates* the collective action problem,[126] but to do so it must forget the Self's dependence on the Other's recognition of his rights and identities. Thus, since that dependence could be threatened by being self-interested all the way down, liberalism arguably contains a deep tension between its legitimation of self-interest and the fact that individuals have an objective interest in the group which makes their

[125] MacPherson (1962: 3), quoted from Shotter (1990: 166).

[126] The effect of individualization on collective action is an old theme of Marxist scholarship (see Jessop, 1978; Poulantzas, 1978), and has also featured in more recent work on social movements (Pizzorno, 1991). For an application to the international system see Paros (1999).

individuality possible. This tension may underlie some of the worry today in the West about the erosion of community values in favor of individual self-interest.

As Ruggie has suggested, the Westphalian culture has a similar effect on states.[127] It constitutes states as the individuals with the right to play the game of international politics, but does so in a way that makes each state seem to be the sole proprietor and guardian of that right. Westphalian states are possessive individuals who do not appreciate the ways in which they depend on each other for their identity, being instead "jealous" of their sovereignty and eager to make their own way in the world. An important reason for this individualistic attitude may be the criterion for membership in international society itself, which encourages states to treat juridical sovereignty as an entitlement due them as a result of purely their own efforts to establish empirical sovereignty first. The effect of collective amnesia that juridical sovereignty is dependent on others is to constitute self-interest as the appropriate way to relate to each other, and self-help as its systemic corollary. Self-interest and self-help are not intrinsic attributes of states and anarchy, in other words, but effects of a particular conception of the individual. The role structure of rivalry feeds on this conception. Rivals know that they are members of a group in which individuals do not kill each other, but this collective identity is usually in the background of their interactions, which center instead on jealously protecting and advancing their own interests within that context. As we have seen, these efforts are mitigated by states' self-limiting behavior, as well as by the occasional reminder by threats from outside that they are in fact part of a group, and as such the system is not self-help all the way down. But whether this mutual dependence can in the long run survive an ideology of possessive individualism is not clear.

The suggestion that Westphalian states are afflicted with a possessive individualism stemming from collective amnesia about their social roots raises a concluding question about whether a Lockean culture could be compatible with a more "relational" individualism that acknowledged those roots. In social theory this question has been taken up especially by feminists, who have argued that the atomistic and egoistic view of the individual found in liberalism and its

[127] Ruggie (1983a).

rationalist off-shoots in social science is a gendered view rooted in the male experience.[128] Feminist IR scholars have used these arguments to critique the traditional view of state sovereignty, pointing toward the possibility of a relational view in which inter-state rivalry would be less intense and collective action more likely.[129]

Whether or not the Westphalian theory of sovereignty is intrinsically gendered is an important and challenging question that I cannot address here. It is clear that feminist critiques can be fruitfully applied to that theory, but less clear whether this is because gender has had a causal impact on Westphalian sovereignty, since there are structurally similar, non-feminist critiques of liberalism that come to many of the same conclusions, but do so via psychological, sociological, or anthropological evidence.[130] Whatever the causal roots of the possessive view of sovereignty might be, in turn, there is also the question of how a relational view would differ from the conception of individuality found in the fully internalized Kantian culture, which I consider in passing below.

The Third Degree Lockean culture is the basis for what we today take to be "common sense" about international politics: that a certain type of state is the main actor in the system, that these actors are self-interested individualists, that the international system is therefore in part a self-help system – but that states also recognize each other's sovereignty and so are rivals rather than enemies, that they have status quo interests which induce them to constrain their own behavior and cooperate when threatened from outside, and that the system is therefore in part an other-help system qualitatively different in its fundamental logic than the Hobbesian world of *sauve qui peut*. This common sense is the starting point for mainstream theorizing in IR, which tends to discount the importance of cultural variables. What I have tried to do is endogenize this starting point, to show that it depends on a particular cultural background which can be taken as given for certain purposes, but without which we cannot make sense of modern international politics. This matters for the larger argument of this book, in turn, because if today's common sense about international politics is a function of historically con-

[128] See, for example, DiStefano (1983), Scheman (1983), and England and Kilbourne (1990).

[129] Keohane (1988b), Tickner (1989), and several contributions to Peterson, ed. (1990).

[130] See, for example, Sandel (1982), Sampson (1988), Markus and Kitayama (1991), and Kitzinger (1992).

tingent shared ideas rather than the intrinsic nature of states or anarchy, then the question arises how that common sense might be transformed, and with it the cultural conditions of possibility for mainstream thinking.

The Kantian culture

Lockean assumptions have dominated Westphalian politics for the past three centuries. Hobbesianism has occasionally reared its head, but each time has been beaten back down by status quo states. This Lockean dominance is reflected in IR scholarship, which despite the deference given to "The Hobbesian Problem" has focused much more on the problems of getting along in a live and let live system than of surviving in a kill or be killed one. Yet since World War II the behavior of the North Atlantic states, and arguably many others, seems to go well beyond a Lockean culture. In such a culture we expect states sometimes to use force to settle disputes, yet no such violence has occurred in the North Atlantic region; and we also expect them to think individualistically about their security, yet these states have consistently operated as a security "team." The cause of these departures from Lockean norms might be structural in the Neorealist sense, namely a bipolar distribution of capabilities that temporarily suppressed intra-Western rivalries, which the collapse of the Soviet Union should now reignite.[131] There is another possible structural cause of these patterns, however, an idealist one, which is that a new international political culture has emerged in the West within which non-violence and team play are the norm, in which case there might not be any such return to the past. I will call this culture "Kantian" because Kant's *Perpetual Peace* is the most well-known treatment of it,[132] but in doing so I will remain agnostic about whether his emphasis on republican states is the only way to realize it. A world of republican states may be a sufficient condition for a Kantian culture, but we do not yet know if it is necessary. My sketch of this culture will be briefer than the others, especially on internalization, since the reader by now has got the basic idea.

[131] For example, Mearsheimer (1990a).
[132] See especially Hurrell (1990) and Huntley (1996).

Friendship

The Kantian culture is based on a role structure of friendship. Relative to "enemy," the concept of "friend" is undertheorized in social theory, and especially in IR, where substantial literature exists on enemy images but little on friend images, on enduring rivalries but little on enduring friendships, on the causes of war but little on the causes of peace, and so on. On the surface there seem to be good empirical and theoretical reasons for this imbalance. Enmity is a much bigger problem for international politics than friendship, and history suggests that few states remain friends for long anyway. Realists see this as evidence that the search for friendship in anarchy is utopian and even dangerous, and that the most we can hope for is that states will act on the basis of "interests" (rivalry?) rather than "passions" (enmity?).[133] Rationalists, in turn, have difficulty squaring friendship with a model of states as self-interested utility-maximizers. And then there is this gut feeling that thinking about states as "friends" simply takes anthropomorphism one step too far.

Yet there are also empirical and theoretical arguments pointing the other way. Statesmen today routinely refer to other states as friends. "Cheap talk" perhaps, but it is reflected in their behavior. The US and Britain are widely acknowledged to have a "special" relationship, and to a lesser degree the same can be said of many other dyads in today's international system, even France and Germany, whose recent behavior seems easier to explain by the logic of friendship than by enmity or rivalry. On the theoretical side, Schmitt[134] saw friendship as fully half, with enmity, of the deep structure of "the political," and Wolfers[135] too recognized the importance of enmity *and* amity in international relations. Finally, while it is important to take the problems of anthropomorphism seriously, if scholars are willing to treat states as enemies then it makes no sense to apply a different standard to "friend." For all these reasons, it seems time to begin thinking systematically about the nature and consequences of friendship in international politics.

As I shall use the term,[136] friendship is a role structure within which states expect each other to observe two simple rules: (1) disputes will

[133] Cf. Hirschman (1977), Williams (1998).
[134] Schmitt (1932/1976).
[135] Wolfers (1962).
[136] This treatment is tailored to the problem of national security; for a broader discussion see Badhwar, ed. (1993).

be settled without war or the threat of war (the rule of non-violence); and (2) they will fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened by a third party (the rule of mutual aid). Three points about these rules should be noted. First, the rules are independent and equally necessary. Non-violence could in principle be accompanied by indifference to the fate of the Other (as when parties agree to "live in peace but go their separate ways"), while mutual aid against outsiders could be accompanied by force within the relationship (as in the "care" of the husband who beats his wife but protects her from violence by other men). Friendship exists when states expect each other to observe both rules. Second, friendship concerns national security only, and need not spill over into other issue areas. Non-violence and mutual aid impose limits on how other issues can be handled, but within those limits friends may have considerable conflict. Finally, and most importantly, friendship is temporally open-ended, in which respect it is qualitatively different from being "allies." Allies engage in the same basic behavior as friends, but they do not expect their relationship to continue indefinitely. An alliance is a temporary, mutually expedient arrangement within rivalry, or perhaps enmity, and so allies expect to eventually revert to a condition in which war between them is an option – and will plan accordingly. Friends may of course have a falling out, but their expectation up front is that the relationship will continue.

The logic of Kantian anarchy

The two rules of friendship generate the macro-level logics and tendencies associated with "pluralistic security communities" and "collective security." In their seminal work, Karl Deutsch and his associates defined a pluralistic security community as a system of states (hence "pluralistic") in which "there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way."[137] Real assurance here comes not from a Leviathan who enforces peace through centralized power (an "amalgamated" security community), but from shared knowledge of each other's peaceful intentions and behavior. As always this knowledge is not 100 percent certain, but neither is the

[137] Karl Deutsch, *et al.* (1957: 5). This work has recently been considerably deepened by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds. (1998).

knowledge that a Leviathan will keep the peace, as the frequency of civil war attests.[138] The issue is one of probability, not possibility. War is always a logical possibility between states because the capacity for violence is inherent to their nature, but in a pluralistic security community war is no longer considered a legitimate way of settling disputes. This does not prevent conflicts from arising, but when they do arise they are handled by negotiation, arbitration, or the courts, even when the material cost of war to one or both parties might be low. The US and Canada have a variety of conflicts over fishing, trade, and the environment, for example, but the US does not consider violence as a means of getting its way, despite its overwhelming military power. What the shared knowledge that constitutes a security community does, in other words, is change the meaning of military power from its meaning in rivalry. In disputes among rivals relative military capabilities matter to outcomes because the parties know they might be used. In disputes among friends this is not the case, and other kinds of power (discursive, institutional, economic) are more salient.[139]

One way to think about the difference between a pluralistic security community and a collective security system is that the former concerns disputes within a group, while the latter concerns disputes between a group and outsiders (whether non-members or erstwhile members who have renounced the group's norms). Collective security is based on the principle of mutual aid,[140] or "all for one, one for all": when the security of any one member of the system is threatened by aggression all members are supposed to come to its defense even if their own individual security is not at stake.[141] The norm is one of "generalized" reciprocity, in which actors help each other even when there is no direct or immediate return, as there is in "specific" reciprocity.[142] When such a norm is functioning properly the dominant behavioral tendency will be one of multilateralism or other-help with respect to national security.[143] Because of this collective security is usually juxtaposed to the balance of power, which relies on the alternative principle of self-help. Self-help may lead states to form

[138] Indeed, Deutsch, *et al.* (1957) found that pluralistic security communities had a better track record of keeping the peace than states.

[139] See Bially (1998). [140] Kropoktin (1914).

[141] See Claude (1962), Wolfers (1962), Kupchan and Kupchan (1991), and Downs, ed. (1994).

[142] Taylor (1982: 29), Keohane (1986a). [143] Ruggie, ed. (1993).

alliances, which also involve collective action, but the difference between ally and friend makes for a qualitative difference between alliances and collective security. In an alliance states engage in collective action because they each feel *individually* threatened by the same threat. Their collaboration is self-interested and will end when the common threat is gone. Collective security is neither threat- nor time-specific. Its members pledge mutual aid because they see themselves as a single unit for security purposes *a priori*, no matter by whom, when, or whether they might be threatened. Their military capabilities therefore have a different meaning for each other than they do in an alliance. Parties to the latter know that their allies' capabilities might be used against them once their collaboration is over, and as such they pose a latent threat to each other which colors their choices, even if that threat is temporarily suppressed by the greater threat of external aggression. True "thinking like a team"[144] is impossible in such circumstances. In collective security states' capabilities have a different meaning. Far from being latent threats they are an asset to all, since each knows they will only be used on behalf of the collective.

In IR scholarship collective security has traditionally been defined as a universal system, such that anything short of global membership means that a balance of power and rivalry must be at work. This seems too restrictive. It is true that universal collective security is necessary for a Kantian culture *at the global level*. However, making collective security an all or nothing proposition obscures two important possibilities. One is that states may operate on an "all for one, one for all" basis within relatively autonomous regional sub-systems or security complexes, but not with outsiders.[145] Although this is not the case today, for example, within South America or the Indian subcontinent we can imagine states engaging in mutual aid even if they are not individually threatened. The other possibility is that even when a balance of power system dominates the global level, states within each bloc might collaborate not because they perceive the other bloc as a threat to their individual security, but because they believe in a team approach to security with the members of their bloc. The fact that the members of a bloc can be either rivals or friends also helps us explain change over time, as in the case of NATO, which may have formed initially as an alliance with the expectation that it would be

[144] Sugden (1993). [145] See Downs and Iida (1994: 18–19); cf. Buzan (1991).

temporary, but seems to have become a collective security system with an expectation of permanence.[146] What constitutes collective security are the reasons for and open-endedness of collective action, not how universal it is.

To my knowledge there has been little work on the relationship between pluralistic security communities and collective security systems, perhaps in part because of the tendency to think of the latter as universal. The preceding discussion indicates that at least in theory they have different structures, with different logics and tendencies, which stem from the two rules of friendship. In practice, however, they tend to go together. Observing a rule of non-violence with a neighbor may remove a potential security threat, but by itself does little to protect from aggressive third parties the peaceful neighborhood of which both are part. Observing a rule of mutual aid, in turn, helps protect a state from those third parties, but will be hard to sustain if states insist on settling their own disputes by force. Taken individually, in other words, the two tendencies do not seem qualitatively different from the patterns associated with the logic of rivalry. Taken together, however, they do constitute a different pattern, and will tend to reinforce each other over time.

Internalization

The Kantian culture is susceptible to the same three degrees of internalization as its counterparts, which determine the pathway by which its norms are realized, its stability over time, and the plausibility of Neorealist, Neoliberal, and Idealist arguments in a given case.

Material coercion in IR tends to be associated with Realism, a defining feature of which (many might say) is the belief that a Kantian culture, of any degree of internalization, can never emerge in an anarchy. This kind of thinking underlies the diagonal thinking in figure 4, which would make the bad things in international life the province of materialist theories and the good things the province of idealist ones. Throughout this book I have argued that this is a problematic assumption. Whatever Realists might think about the likelihood of a Kantian culture, the materialist social theory on which

[146] Risse-Kappen (1996); cf. Kupchan and Kupchan (1991), Duffield (1992).

they characteristically rely should be as applicable to such a culture as to any other. The Kantian culture might be a hard case for materialists in the same way that the Hobbesian is for idealists, but it is not an impossible one.

Part of the Kantian culture, the pluralistic security community, is fairly easy to explain by material coercion, the argument being a simple extension of that used to explain compliance with the Lockean culture. In the latter states are prevented against their will from killing each other; now they are prevented from even attacking. This might be due to deterrence and/or sanctions by status quo states against revisionists (where these terms are now defined by acceptance not only of others' sovereignty, but of their right to be free from violence), but before such measures are even necessary revisionist states could be prevented from attacking simply by the expected costs of war. Economic interdependence, the fragility of modern civilization, and especially the spread of nuclear weapons could make even limited warfare irrational. This in turn suggests an interesting rationale for managed nuclear proliferation.[147]

Collective security poses a more serious challenge for a coercion theory. Here coercion has to explain not only non-violence but cooperation, and, moreover, do so in a way that distinguishes it from alliance behavior. If only a few states in a collective security system are reluctant cooperators then this might not be too difficult, since the majority could force them into burden sharing through a variety of formal and informal sanctions. But this leaves the cooperation of the majority, and with them the existence of the system, unexplained. To explain their cooperation in coercive, non-alliance terms we need factors that threaten them as a group rather than individually, and that are not seen as temporary. Two candidates might be the fear of planetary devastation due to environmental collapse or nuclear war.[148] Both would create functional imperatives for states to cooperate against their will on issues of national security.

It is easier, though ultimately still difficult, to explain compliance with the Kantian culture if it has been internalized to the Second Degree, which means that states follow its norms for reasons of individual self-interest. The principal difference from the First Degree case is that here states do not have a desire to violate the rules (i.e.

[147] See Mearsheimer (1990a), Waltz (1990).
[148] Weigert (1991), Deudney (1993).

their interests are not revisionist, even if they might engage in revisionist behavior), and thus they do not need to be coerced into complying against their will. However, unlike the Third Degree case they have no particular desire to follow the rules either; their behavior reflects a purely instrumental calculation about whether compliance will advance exogenous interests, rather than an interest one way or another in the rules as such.

The self-interest explanation for pluralistic security community is again an extension of that used to explain compliance with Lockean norms. The costs of violating the norm still figure in states' calculations, but rather than thwarting an interest in aggression they are now viewed indifferently as simply part of the incentive structure for different behaviors. Collective security is harder to explain with this account, since whereas non-violence might be a "dilemma of common aversions," mutual aid is a "dilemma of common interests"[149] and as such subject to the collective action problem. Inis Claude's classic critique of collective security highlights the difficulty of making such a system work when states are self-interested.[150] Nevertheless, one of the important contributions of Neoliberal scholarship has been to show that in certain conditions – low discount rates on future utility, small number of actors, the presence of institutions that lower uncertainty and transaction costs, and so on – egoistic states can overcome collective action problems. Most of this literature has focused on political economy, but some has addressed collective security.[151]

Rather than try to summarize this rich and extensive body of work, let me just note its implications for what I am calling friendship between states. When collective security norms are internalized only to the Second Degree, friendship is a *strategy*, an instrumentality, that states choose in order to obtain benefits for themselves as individuals. There is no identification of Self with Other, no equating national interests with international interests,[152] no sacrifice for the group except as necessary to realize their own, exogenous interests; all this is disallowed by a non-tautological definition of self-interest. At this degree of internalization, in other words, states have an impoverished conception of "friendship," one that most individuals might think

[149] Stein (1983). [150] Claude (1962: 152–204).

[151] See, for example, Keohane (1984), Lipson (1984), Oye, ed. (1986), Martin (1992), and Downs, ed. (1994).

[152] Claude (1962: 199).

hardly worth the name. Yet they behave "as if" they were friends, coming to each other's aid when their security is threatened, and doing so with the shared expectation that this pattern will continue indefinitely. For egoistic states friendship might be nothing more than a hat that they try on each morning for their own reasons, one that they will take off as soon as the costs outweigh the benefits, but until that happens they will be friends in fact even if not in principle.

That said, few cultures will be stable in the long run if their members are engaged in an on-going calculation about whether compliance serves their individual interests. Given the relatively demanding obligations of friendship, this provides reason to doubt whether a Second Degree Kantian culture could ever consolidate at the international level. However, just as there is a lot more collective action in domestic life than the pure self-interest model leads us to expect, so it may be possible for states to mitigate their collective action problems by internalizing Kantian norms to a deeper level.

With the Third Degree of internalization states in the Kantian culture accept the claims it makes on their behavior as legitimate. As I am interpreting the concept of legitimacy, this means that states identify with each other, seeing each other's security not just as instrumentally related to their own, but as literally being their own. The cognitive boundaries of the Self are extended to include the Other; Self and Other form a single "cognitive region."[153] In chapter 5 I used the concept of collective identity to describe this phenomenon, but there are many cognates in the literature which would serve equally well: "we-feeling," "solidarity," "plural subject," "common in-group identity," "thinking like a team," "loyalty,"[154] and so on. All refer to a shared, super-ordinate identity that overlays and has legitimate claims on separate bodily identities. This identity creates collective interests, which means that not only are actors' choices interdependent, which is true even of egoists in game theory, but so are their interests.[155] International interests are now part of the national interest, not just interests that states have to advance in order to advance their separate national interests; friendship is a preference over an outcome, not just a preference over a strategy.[156] And this in turn helps generate other-help or altruistic behavior, which many

[153] Adler (1997a).

[154] See, respectively, Deutsch, *et al.* (1957), Markovsky and Chaffee (1995), Gilbert (1989), Gaertner, *et al.* (1993), Sugden (1993), Oldenquist (1982).

[155] Hochman and Nitzan (1985). [156] Powell (1994: 318).

students of social dilemmas have argued is often crucial to explaining the success of collective action in the real world.[157] It is important to note that this does not imply a necessarily zero-sum relationship with helping oneself, as the concepts of "other-help" and "altruism" might suggest, since collective identity is constituted by defining the welfare of the Self to *include* that of the Other, not by serving the Other's welfare to the exclusion of the Self's, which is a rather different thing (martyrdom perhaps). However, collective identity does imply a willingness when necessary to make sacrifices for the Other for his own sake, because he has legitimate claims on the Self. In the context of the Kantian culture, in other words, it implies that states must really be friends, not just act as if they are.

Identification with others is rarely total. Even at the level of individuals, who are by nature group animals, people routinely have both egoistic and collective motivations. This is emphasized in an interesting way by psychoanalytic social theorists, who stress the ambivalent nature of all internalizations because of the fear of "deindividuation," of being swallowed up by the needs of the group.[158] Resistance to internalization makes sense in light of evolutionary theory, since if individuals were predisposed to sacrifice themselves entirely to group needs they would probably not live long enough to reproduce themselves. The pull of egoism is likely to be even stronger for states, who as corporate beings are predisposed to favor the needs of their members over those of outsiders and thus are not inherently group "animals" (chapter 5). In the provision of collective security this tendency is likely to manifest itself in frequent arguments about free riding and burden sharing, which should they remain unresolved may undermine collective identities. Yet none of this vitiates the possibility of such identities, since actors are capable of having multiple group identifications at once. Americans may identify first with the United States, but typically will also identify to varying degrees with their home state, Canada, the West, and even mankind as a whole, which depending on the issue will affect their behavior accordingly. There is no reason to think the same would not be true of states, who may form a collective identity when it comes to physical security, yet be exceedingly individualistic or jealous of their

[157] See, for example, Lynn and Oldenquist (1986), Melucci (1989), Dawes, *et al.* (1990), Calhoun (1991), Morris and Mueller, eds. (1992), and Kramer and Goldman (1995).

[158] See Kaye (1991: 101) and Alford (1994: 87–88).

sovereignty when it comes to burden sharing, economic growth, cultural autonomy, or what have you. What social scientists should do is explore the tensions between different levels of group identification, not assume a priori that they do not exist.

Beyond the anarchy problematique?

It may be useful to conclude this discussion by pointing out that the Kantian culture calls into question two core assumptions of the anarchy problematique on which this chapter has been based, namely our traditional understandings of "anarchy" and "state." Waltz treated these terms as a dichotomy, with the state defined as centralized authority ("hierarchy") and anarchy as the absence of hierarchy, which means that the international system would by definition be an anarchy until there is a world government. More recently Helen Milner[159] and others have suggested that anarchy-hierarchy should be seen as a continuum rather than dichotomy, and interest has also emerged in the idea of "governance without government," which highlights ways in which anarchic systems may nonetheless be governed by institutions.[160] These are important conceptual innovations, but noteworthy also in that they do not directly challenge the traditional meanings of "anarchy" and "state." Making anarchy-hierarchy a continuum still assumes that anarchy is overcome to the extent that authority is centralized, and the literature on international governance has not argued that the system is not formally an anarchy.

There is no reason to question traditional understandings of concepts just for its own sake. However, in this case it may be useful because a distinctive feature of the Kantian anarchy is an at least de facto rule of law, which limits what states can legitimately do to advance their interests. Enforcement of these limits is not centralized, which may reduce the surety and swiftness with which violations are punished, but as long as most states have internalized them they will be seen as a legitimate constraint on their actions and enforced collectively. And since legitimate constraint or power is the basis for "authority," this raises the intriguing possibility that what the Kantian culture creates is *de*centralized authority – an "internationalization of political authority" in Ruggie's[161] words – an idea which has not been

[159] Milner (1991). [160] Rosenau and Czempiel, eds. (1992), Young (1994).
[161] Ruggie (1983b).

developed in the literature. A decentralized authority structure does not seem to be an anarchy, if that is taken literally to mean "without rule," nor does it seem to be a state (or on a continuum of stateness, as the European Union arguably is) if that means *centralized* authority. What a Kantian culture based on the rule of law suggests, in other words, is that two dimensions are relevant to the constitution of anarchy/non-anarchy rather than the traditional one, namely the degree of centralization of power *and* the degree of authority enjoyed by the system's norms.[162] These dimensions are logically independent, as suggested even by the textbook definition of the state as a structure of "centralized authority," which if it is not to be redundant implies the possibility also of decentralized authority.

So dominant in contemporary consciousness is the assumption that authority must be centralized that scholars are just beginning to grapple with how decentralized authority might be understood. One possibility is Bull's idea of "neo-Medievalism," which given the problems posed by the concept of the "feudal state" has the advantage of leaving our traditional understanding of "state" intact.[163] Others have tried to rethink the concept of the state, with neo-Marxists opting for the idea of an "international state,"[164] and others for a "post-modern" state.[165] Recent work on constitutionalism in the EU also speaks to this problem,[166] and Arend Lijphart's[167] discussion of "consociationalism" may be relevant as well. I cannot address these possibilities here, but the question of how to think about a world that is becoming "domesticated"[168] but not centralized, about a world "after anarchy,"[169] is one of the most important questions today facing not only students of international politics but of political theory as well.[170]

Conclusion

Let me summarize the main points of the chapter, and then address a concluding question about time and progress.

There is no such thing as a "logic of anarchy" *per se*. The term

[162] Nau (1993); cf. Onuf and Klink (1989). [163] Bull (1977: 264–276).
[164] Cox (1987), Picciotto (1991), Wendt (1994), Caporaso (1996).
[165] Sorenson (1997); cf. Ruggie (1993). [166] Bellamy, *et al.*, eds. (1995).
[167] Lijphart (1977), Taylor (1990).
[168] Ashley (1987); see also Hanrieder (1978).
[169] Hurd (1999). [170] See Walker (1993), Held (1995).

"anarchy" itself makes clear why this must be so: it refers to an absence ("with*out* rule"), not a presence; it tells us what there is not, not what there is. It is an empty vessel, without intrinsic meaning. What gives anarchy meaning are the kinds of people who live there and the structure of their relationships. This is true even for Neorealism, which derives its conclusions about anarchy by assuming that the actors are states and therefore armed, that they are necessarily self-interested but not in a bad, inherently aggressive way, and that their interactions are structured mainly by material forces.[171] I have also taken states as my actors, while allowing their interests to vary. Crucially, however, I argued that the most important structures in which states are embedded are made of ideas, not material forces. Ideas determine the meaning and content of power, the strategies by which states pursue their interests, and interests themselves. (Note that this is not to say that ideas are more important than power and interest, but rather that they constitute them; see chapter 3.) Thus, it is not that anarchic systems have no structure or logic, but rather that these are a function of social structures, not anarchy. Anarchy is a nothing, and nothings cannot be structures.

Distributions of ideas are social structures. Some of these ideas are shared and some are not. I focused on the former, which make up the part of social structure known as culture. In this chapter, therefore, the shared ideas or culture of an anarchic system is its structure, although in reality there is more to its social structure than that. I proposed that anarchy can have at least three distinct cultures, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, which are based on different role relationships, enemy, rival, and friend. These structures and roles are instantiated in states' representations of Self and Other (role identities) and ensuing practices, but it is at the macro-level, relatively autonomous from what states think and do, that they acquire logics and tendencies that persist through time. Cultures are self-fulfilling prophecies that tend to reproduce themselves. Thus, even though defining the structure of the international system as a distribution of ideas calls our attention to the possibility that those ideas, and with them the "logic of anarchy," might change, it is no implication of this model that structural change is easy or even possible in given historical circumstances.

[171] As Robert Powell (1994: 315) puts it, "what have often been taken to be the implications of anarchy do not really follow from the assumption of anarchy. Rather, these implications result from other implicit and unarticulated assumptions about the states' strategic environment."

Much depends on how deeply states have internalized their shared culture. This can have three degrees, which generate three pathways by which cultures can be realized, coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy. Cultural forms reproduced primarily by coercion tend to be the least stable, those by legitimacy the most. In IR scholarship today these pathways are associated with competing theories, Neorealism, Neoliberalism, and Idealism? (constructivism), but since it is an empirical question which pathway realizes a given cultural form, all three theories have something to tell us. But it is important to emphasize that the question of how deeply a culture is internalized is unrelated to how conflictual it is. Against the tacit assumption in much of IR that more shared ideas equals more cooperation, I have argued that the concept of culture is analytically neutral between conflict and cooperation. A Hobbesian war of all against all can be as much a cultural form as Kantian collective security. Knowing which of these cultures dominates is the first thing we need to know about a particular anarchic system, and will enable us to make sense in turn of the role that power and interest play within it.

The key question that I have *not* addressed in this chapter is the question of process, of how the structures of international politics are reproduced and transformed by the practices of state (and non-state) agents. The discussion so far has been about structure, not process. I have shown that the structure of anarchy varies with changes in the distribution of ideas, but not how those changes and resulting structures are produced and sustained. I have not yet shown, in other words, that "anarchy is what states make of it." That is what I try to do in the next chapter. By way of transition, I want to end this chapter with a question that arises naturally from the way it was organized, which is whether I mean to suggest that cultures of international politics tend to evolve in a linear direction or progress over time. As figure 4 graphically suggests, this question of cultural "time" has two aspects, vertical and horizontal.[172]

The vertical question is whether with respect to a given culture there is a tendency for actors to internalize it more deeply over time, to move inevitably from First Degree internalization to Third.[173] My view here is a qualified yes. As cultural practices get routinized in the form of habits they get pushed into the shared cognitive background,

[172] I want to thank Jennifer Mitzen for first encouraging me to think about this question.
[173] On habit see Camic (1986), Rosenau (1986), and Baldwin (1988).

becoming taken for granted rather than objects of calculation. Other things being equal, therefore, the longer a practice has been in existence the deeper it will be embedded in the individual and collective consciousness. This generalization must be qualified, of course, by the fact that other things are never equal. Apart from exogenous shocks, if a norm comports with an actor's exogenously given needs or wants, for example, then it may be internalized very quickly; if it is at odds with those needs then it may be accepted only slowly. This is why I chose the term "degree" rather than "stage" to describe depths of internalization. Like third degree burns, in the right conditions norms can become internalized almost instantaneously. Although strictly speaking third degree burns have to go through first and second degree stages first, if the heat is high enough it is possible to speed up time and for all practical purposes skip stages. The same is true of socialization.

Perhaps the more provocative question about cultural time in international politics is the horizontal one of whether it is inevitable that anarchies will move from Hobbesian to Lockean to Kantian structures – a rather different "logic of anarchy" than Realists propose – which, on one definition at least, amounts to a question about the inevitability of "progress."[174] Here my feeling is that the answer must be no, but with a twist.

There is nothing in this chapter to suggest that there must be a progressive evolution in the political culture of the international system. The argument has not been "dialectical" in that sense; it has emphasized the fundamentally conservative nature of culture, not its progressivism. To be sure, the high death rate of the Hobbesian culture creates incentives to create a Lockean culture, and the continuing violence of the latter, particularly as the forces of destruction improve in response to its competitive logic, creates incentives in turn to move to a Kantian culture. But there is no historical necessity, no guarantee, that the incentives for progressive change will overcome human weaknesses and the countervailing incentives to maintain the status quo. The passage of time may simply deepen bad norms, not create good ones. Note that this is different from saying, as Realists are wont to do, that progress in international politics is impossible. In fact, it seems obvious that today's international system represents considerable progress over that of 500 or

[174] On progress in international relations see Adler and Crawford, eds. (1991).

even 1500 A.D.; progress there has been. The point is rather that it is contingent, not necessary.

The twist, however, is that even if there is no guarantee that cultural time in international politics will move forward, I do think one can argue that it will not move backward, unless there is a big exogenous shock. Once a Lockean culture has been internalized there is little chance of it degenerating into a Hobbesian one, and similarly for a Kantian into a Lockean. The historical trajectory of the franchise in democratic societies provides an instructive analogy. As Robert Goodin[175] points out, there are almost no cases of voting rights being (selectively) taken away after once being granted. The reason – and here I modify Goodin's more rationalistic explanation – is that once people have internalized the privilege of voting they will fight hard to keep it, making regression too costly. This adds to the traditional constraint of path dependency: not only is the future of a system shaped by the path it took in the past, but the option of "turning around" in the chosen path is closed off. A similar argument may apply to states. With each "higher" international culture states acquire *rights* – to sovereignty in the Lockean case, freedom from violence and security assistance in the Kantian – that they will be loathe to give up, whatever new institutions they may create in the future. This process may not survive exogenous shocks, like invasion (the barbarian invasion of Rome), or a revolution in the domestic constitution of member states (the American and French Revolutions). But with respect to its endogenous dynamic, the argument suggests that the history of international politics will be unidirectional: if there are any structural changes, they will be historically progressive. Thus, even if there is no guarantee that the future of the international system wil be better than its past, at least there is reason to think it will not be worse.

[175] Goodin (1992: 95–96).